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I. INTRODUCTION
And o f course the arena where we're "supposed" to discuss these 
issues is always something toothless like the International Labor 
Organization. Pigs will fly  before you hear about an anti-worker 
US labor law being threatened by the ILO.
United Students Against Sweatshops, 22 August 1999
International labour rights are enjoying a renaissance. The issue of the conditions under 
which people work across the world is again moving towards the centre of the political 
stage, not only in individual countries such as the United States and the members of the 
European Union, but also in the multilateral fora. After the demise (albeit perhaps 
temporary) of the social clause debate in the GATT in the early 1990s, the past two years 
have seen a significant increase not only in international labour rights advocacy, but also 
in the visibility of that activity and the breadth of participation in the debate. When the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) attempted to exclude a labour conditions link to 
international trade sanctions in 1996,1 consternation or jubilation was felt in 
international organisations and trade and labour ministries around the world, but the 
uninvolved layperson knew little about the outcome and perhaps less about the issues 
involved. By 1998 however, the issues of trade and labour rights were to be dealt with not 
by diplomats inside international organisations, but by activists outside on the street, 
some being less violent (the Global March Against Child Labour outside the headquarters 
of the International Labour Organization in Geneva of June 1998) than others (the WTO 
protest of September 1998). These types of developments have, with the help of the 
media, brought the issues clearly into the mainstream public arena.
Far from waning, the international labour rights trend looks like continuing well into the 
millennium year. In the United States, the student anti-sweatshop campaign2 is now the 
largest campus-based movement in that country since the Vietnam War protests,3 with its
1 World Trade Organization (WTO) Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W.
2 United Students Against Sweatshops :http://home.sprintmail.com/~jeffnkari/USAS/.
3 ‘Activism surges at campuses nationwide, and labor is at issue’, New York Times, 29 March 
1999.
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leaders enjoying media profiles and the attention of senior Democrat politicians.4 At the 
same time we see the advent of a plethora of private initiatives in developed countries 
aimed guaranteeing certain levels of working conditions for producers of goods 
manufactured in the developing world. These initiatives largely derive from the new­
found power of the consumer, power which has been used to boycott some of the largest 
multinational corporation in the world. From formal quasi-govemmental initiatives such 
as the Fair Labour Association in the United States,5 to the many hundreds of corporate 
codes of conduct and social labelling schemes, the promotion of labour rights (or in many 
corporate instances, the interest in being seen to be promoting labour rights) appears to be 
growing both in the public and private spheres. The centrality of the issue to the 
contemporary international debate will likely be underlined in the lead up to and during 
the Third WTO Ministerial Conference opening in Seattle on 30 November.6
The central issue in this movement (if it can be termed as such) concerns the way in 
which acceptable conditions of work can be guaranteed to workers all over the world. 
This not insignificant goal has preoccupied individuals and organisations for at least the 
last 100 years, not the least of which has been the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) which is the largest and most truly global source of international labour regulation. 
This latest surge in labour rights activism, however, does not look to rely on the ILO’s 
system of labour standards and their supervisory mechanisms. More distressing for the 
ILO is the fact that the students, the labour-activists, the multinationals, the (largely 
liberal-Western) governments and other actors rarely even mention the existence of the 
ILO’s sophisticated and long-standing system. Although relatively successful in the past, 
the ILO system is seen by many as being ineffective in an era of liberalised trade and 
globalised labour markets. The actors are looking for new tools to gain and maintain
4 Student leaders were invited to brief the senior policy advisor to Democrat House Minority 
Leader Richard Gephardt on 19 July 1999.
5 See http://www.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/nosweat/partnership/aip.htm.
6 Building on the Global Day of Protest Against the WTO on 15 September 1999, trade ministers 
meeting in Seattle will compete with rallies such as the International Forum On Globalization 
Teach-In on the World Trade Organization, the People’s Assembly/March-Rally Against 
WTO/Globalization, and the AFL-CIO Rally and March at the WTO. See
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labour rights, and international labour standards in the ILO mould are seen as 
unresponsive and outdated.
Regarded from any point of view, these developments squarely challenge the ILO and its 
system of labour standards. In responding, it is submitted that the Organisation has two 
broad options: to either revise its labour standards system so as to make it more 
responsive to the changed global context, or to move beyond standards as a means of 
regulating labour rights across the globe. Revision of the labour standards system has 
long been on the ILO agenda. Relatively minor aspects of the system have been revised 
over its seventy year history, though the basic structures, scope and conception have 
remained unchanged. Moving beyond standards has been a step that the ILO has, until 
recently, not been prepared to take for fear of weakening the labour standards system and 
ultimately the ILO itself. As the core activity of the Organization, and the oldest and 
largest consensus based system of international regulation in the world, a move away 
from the core ideal of standards could only be contemplated if the maintenance of the 
standards system was itself undermining the feasibility of the Organization. For many, 
this point has been reached.
Whether or not this is true, two new methods of regulating labour rights at the 
international level have arisen as options to the ILO’s system of international labour 
standards. The first of these options (the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights Work of June 1998) came from within the Organisation while the other (private 
sector initiatives, of which corporate codes of conduct and social labelling are the most 
important) originated outside of the ILO . This thesis proposes to look critically at each of 
these methods as alternatives to the international labour standards system, exploring the 
effectiveness and limitations of each and suggesting what their adoption by the ILO might 
mean for the future the of the Organization’s system of labour standards.
http://www.citizen.org.
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ILO’s SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR STANDARDS AND IMPACT OF GLOBAL TRADE 
LIBERALISATION ON THAT SYSTEM
Much has been written on the ILO’s standard setting activities.7 The purpose of this
7 A selection would include: J-M. Bonvin, L ’Organisation internationale du travail: Etude sur 
une agence productrice de normes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998); Alcock, A. 
History of the International Labour Organisation (London: Macmillan, 1971); Galenson 
(above); Ghebali, V.Y. ‘Vers la reforme de l'Organisation internationale du Travail’, 30 Ann. 
Français de Droit Int'l pp. 649-671 (1984); Ghebali, V.Y. The International Labour 
Organisation : A Case Study on the Evolution of UN Specialised Agencies (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1989); Gould, W.B. ‘The rights of wage earners : Of human rights and international 
labor standards’, 3 Indus. Rel L. J. pp. 489-516 (1979); Gross Espiell, H. La Organización 
Internacional del Trabajo y los Derechos Humanos en America Latina (Buenos Aires : 
EUDEBA, 1986); Jenks, C.W. Social Justice in The Law of Nations: The ILO Impact After Fifty 
Years (London: OUP, 1970); Johnston, G.A. The International Labour Organisation. Its Work 
for Social and Economic Progress (London: Europa Publications, 1970); Joyce, J. World Labour 
Rights and their Protection (London: Croom Helm, 1980); Landy, E.A. ‘The Influence of 
International Labour Standards. Possibilities and Performance’, 101 International Labour Review 
pp. 555-604 (1970); Landy, E.A. The Effectiveness of International Supervision: Three Decades 
of ILO experience (NY: Oceana Publications, 1966); Leary, V. International Labour 
Conventions and National Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); Poulantzas, N.M. 
‘International Protection of Human Implementation Procedures Within the Framework of the 
International Labour Organisation’, 25 Revue hellénique de droit International, pp. 110-141 
(1972); Pouyat, A.J. ‘The ILO's freedom of association standards and machinery : a summing 
up’, 121 International Labour Review, pp. 287-302 (1982); Rood, M.G. ‘ILO en 
Mensenrechten’, 12 Nederlands Juristen Comité voor de Mensenrechten-Bull. pp. 429-436 
(1987); Samson, K.T. ‘The Changing Pattern of ILO Supervision’, 118 International Labour 
Review, pp. 569-87 (1979); Samson, K.T. ‘International Labour Organisation and Human Rights 
in 1970’, 5 Revue des droits de l'homme, pp. 103-117 (1971); Servais, J.M. ‘Flexibility and 
rigidity in international labour standards’, 125 International Labour Review, pp. 193-209 (1986); 
Valticos, N. Le droit international du travail (Paris: Dalloz, 1980); Vallicos, N. ‘Fifty Years of 
Standard-Setting Activities by the International Labour Organisation’, 100 International Labour 
Review pp. 201-37 (1969); Valticos, N. ‘The Future Prospects for International Labour 
Standards’, 118 International Labour Review, pp. 679-97 (1979); Valticos, N. ‘International 
Labour Organisation: its contribution to the rule of law and the international protection of human 
rights’, 9 Int'l Commission of Jurists Review, pp. 3-34 (1968); Valticos, N. ‘Les Normes de 
l’organisation internationale du travail en matière de protection des droits de l'homme’, 4 Revue 
des droits de l'homme pp. 691-771 (1971); Valticos, N. ‘The Role of the ILO: Future 
Perspectives’, in Human Rights : Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration (ed. B. 
Ramcharan) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979); Wolf, F. ‘ILO Experience in the 
Implementation of Human Rights’, 10 Journal o f International Law and Economics, pp. 599-625 
(1975); Wolf, F. ‘Human Rights and the International Labour Organization’, in Human Rights in 
International Law: Legal and Policy Issues pp. 273-305 (ed. T. Meron) (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984); Zenger, A. ‘Les Droits de l'Homme et le Controle de leur Application au Sein de
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overview is not to retrace that ground but to merely flag some features of the system that 
will allow us firstly to sketch a similarly brief outline of the challenges to the ILO 
standards system posed by trade liberalisation, and secondly to undertake a more 
informed discussion of options open to the Organisation in responding to these
challenges.
Since its founding in 1919, the construction and maintenance of an ‘international labour 
code’* 8 has been central to the mission of the ILO,9 and is still seen as the principal way in 
which the ILO fulfils its mandate and pursues the principles laid down in its 
Constitution.10 Although other sources of regulation of labour conditions at the 
international level has appeared in the meantime,11 12none can compare to the ILO’s system 
of 182 conventions and 190 recommendations for breadth of subject and coverage. “ 
More significantly, the ILO’s system was until recently, generally held up by many 
commentators as an example of a successful exercise in international regulation,13 which 
has been manifested in various ways. Perhaps primarily, the system survived intact not
l'Organisation Internationale du Travail’, in Völkerrecht im Dienste des Menschen. Festschrift 
fur Hans Haug pp. 401-416 (Berne, 1986).
8 The term originated within the ILO: W. Jenks ‘The Corpus Juris of Social Justice’, in Law, 
Freedom and Welfare (London, 1963), quoted in N. Valticos and G. von Potobsky, International 
Labour Law (Deventer: Kluwer, 1995), p. 57.
9 H. Bartolomei, G. von Potobsky and L. Sweptson, The International Labour Organization: The 
international standards system and basic human rights (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), p. 19; 
W. Galenson, The International Labour Organization: an American view (Madison: Wisconsin, 
1981), p. 15.
10 See the Preamble to the ILO Constitution and Article 3 of the Declaration of Philadelphia.
11 Such as those of the Council of Europe and the European Communities.
12 ILO membership currently stands at 174 states. This compares with 191 for the World Health 
Organisation, 186 for UNESCO, 185 for United Nations and 181 for the World Bank (IBRD 
only).
13 See: Leary, International Labour Conventions and National Law, p. 17; Bonvin, 
L'Organisation internationale du travail; Leary, ‘Lessons from the Experience of the 
International Labour Organisation’ in The United Nations and Human Rights: a Critical 
Appraisal (ed. P. Alston) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 580 at 588-95; Galenson, p. 250; 
C. Murphy, International Organisation and industrial Change: Global Governance Since 1850, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) p. 199; Bartolomei, von Potobsky & Swepston, p. 21; Landy, 
The Effectiveness o f International Supervision, p. 198-201; M. Rood, ‘Internationalization: a 
New Incentive’ in Labour Law at the Crossroads: Changing Employment Relationships (eds. J. 
Bellace and M. Rood) (London: Kluwer, 1997), p. 153.
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only the demise of the League of Nations, but also the destruction of the Second World 
War and the ideological confrontation of the Cold War. Over that 80 years the number of 
conventions adopted by the Organisation’s legislative body, the International Labour 
Conference (ILC), has risen unrelentingly while the basic structure and conception of the 
standard setting process has remained unchanged. That this is not a hollow statistic of 
success is shown by the corresponding rise in ratifications of ILO conventions adopted by 
the ILC that occurred until the last two decades. The effect of these ratifications on the 
actual situation of workers in ratifying states is at times difficult to gauge, but a body of 
literature attests to real, if incremental, suffusion of convention norms through domestic 
labour laws.14 Much of this success rested on the nature and functioning in practice of the 
ILO systems supervisory mechanisms, which were seen to have achieved the fine balance 
between robust supervision and an accommodation of national and cultural sensitivities. 
An indicator of this success if the fact that many of the features of the ILO system have 
been adopted by other UN bodies.15
Let us briefly outline the features of the ILO international labour standards system that 
are said to have contributed to this success. First, normative activity is conducted almost 
exclusively through the adoption of conventions and recommendations.16 As such, 
standards are arrived at through a process which is consensual and highly consultative.17 
The key the consensus is tripartism; the hallowed ILO principle by which all legislative
14 Bartolomei, von Potobsky and Sweptson, 127-257; Valticos and von Potobsky, 91-271; Leary, 
International Labour Conventions and National Law, R. Ben-Israel, International Labour 
Standards: the Case o f Freedom to Strike (Deventer: Kluwer, 1988).
15 Leary, ‘Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organisation’, p. 618.
16 To a much lesser extent through the decisions of supervisory bodies, resolutions of executive 
bodies, and guidelines on health and safety: see Bartolomei, von Potobsky and Swepston, p. 13;
17 The subject of a possible convention is usually proposed by the Governing Body of the ILO 
based on a survey of existing standards. The proposal will then often go to a preliminary 
technical conference before being placed on the agenda of the Conference, which will discuss the 
draft convention over two sessions (i.e. over two years). The Conference has before it four 
reports: a report of the Office, a summary of the replies of member states (including input of 
employer and employee representatives) to the Office report, the report of a conference 
committee set up to examine the proposal and a further summary of the replies of member states 
to a draft text. The conference committee then drafts the final text and a drafting committee 
makes a final check before the instrument is proposed for adoption. This procedure can be 
abridged in cases of ‘special urgency’ (Article 34(7) ILC Standing Orders).
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and executive work of the organisation is subject to input by not only governments but 
also worker and employer groups. This feature, which is not shared by any other 
international body, not only gives the Organisation a broader clientele, but also allows it 
to establish direct links with domestic actors, links which are important in the drafting 
and supervision of labour standards.18 Tripartism thus lends ILO conventions a level of 
authority that instruments negotiated solely by states lack:
Standards are the result of comparative work of a utilitarian nature, with an ethical 
content of social development to be attained through international tripartite 
debate. They should be seen as the result of an international tripartite exchange of 
experience intended to guide the evolution and transformation of social 
institutions. Here lies their value and permanent usefulness.19
Consensus, even if it were only among states, gives conventions stature. No member is 
obliged to ratify an ILO convention, hence when it does so, much is made of it ‘freely 
undertaken obligations’. The system, of course, pressures states towards ratification in 
other ways, for example by placing an obligation on member states to submit conventions 
to national legislators for ratification (even if they are ultimately rejected) and by 
requiring non-ratifying states to, in some circumstances, report on why they feel they 
cannot ratify a given convention.20
Success is also borne of the precision with which standards are set. Obligations can be 
clearly defined, recognised and, with some notable exceptions, supervised.21 Standards 
must also comply with a principle of universality which ordains that their application is 
unchanging across all member states. The inherent rigidities of this approach are 
mitigated by the insertion into standards of a range of mechanisms that provide some
I 8Galenson, p. 11.
19 Valticos and von Potobsky, p. 30. Leary is of the view that tripartism also helps to depoliticise 
the Organisation (Leary International Labour Conventions and National Law, p. 152), though it 
is difficult to accept this when one considers the plethora of new interests and agendas that 
accompany both the workers and employers groups.
20 Article 19(5) of the ILO Constitution.
21 Promotional conventions which oblige a member state to move towards certain goals have 
always caused problems in this respect. An example is ILO Convention 122 on employment 
policy, which will be discussed later.
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flexibility*22 Finally, the creation of ILO standards benefits from the input of a highly 
trained technical staff in the Organisations secretariat, the International Labour Office 
(the Office). Conforming to certain functionalist imperatives,23 the Organisation is 
serviced by a large and powerful secretariat of technical specialists designed to provide 
the balance against the ‘political’ tripartite bodies necessary for progress.24
The standards’ supervisory mechanisms have also been lauded. While the fact they 
provide for regular reviews of compliance is more commonplace in other parts of the UN 
system today, during much of the ILO’s history this approach was singular. That is still 
the case in respect of the ILO system’s provision of ‘constitutional procedures of 
representation and complaint’,25 procedure that are no so well established outside the 
ILO.26 27Supervisory mechanisms include both technical and political stages, the former 
being exemplified by the review of the Committee of Experts and the latter by the 
discussion of the Committee of Experts’ report in both the tripartite Governing Body and 
the Conference. This dichotomy is strengthened by a history of a high level of 
independence on the part of the Committee of Experts, when compared to other
22 Hence some conventions allow members to ratify only certain parts of the convention, with a 
view to full ratification at some future date when local conditions have developed. Others allow 
members to specify the level of the standard they are willing to apply on ratification (as long as it 
is above the minimum laid down in the convention). Other means of dealing with the rigidity in 
universal standards include: giving members freedom to set the scope of a convention (for 
example, to whom or in which region it will apply); the use of general language in imposing 
obligations (for example ‘adequate’, ‘sufficient’); and the use of temporary exemptions based on 
under-development of the member state. In addition, there has been a slight trend away from the 
setting of substantive standards to the adoption of so-called ‘promotional conventions’. These 
conventions do not set concrete standards to be achieved, but rather call for a general policy to be 
established. Examples are Convention 122 on employment policy, and the group of conventions 
relating to social security.
23 The landmark work by Ernst Haas, Beyond the nation-state: functionalism and international 
organization (Stanford : Stanford U. P., 1964), chooses the ILO as an example of a functionalist 
international organisation.
24 See Leary, ‘Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organisation’, p. 614.
25 Wilfred Jenks cited in Bartolomei, von Potobsky & Swepston, p. 23.
26 It has been suggested that because the ILO conventions before World War Two were technical 
in nature, the supervisory mechanisms were allowed to become entrenched before the adoption 
of more controversial human rights conventions after the war. Leary, ‘Lessons from the 
Experience of the International Labour Organisation’, p. 619.
27 E. Landy, The Effectiveness of International Supervision, p. 200.
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‘independent bodies’ in the UN system.
These features and the success they are said to have brought, made the ILO justifiably 
proud of its standards system, a pride that may have peaked in 1969 when the 
Organisation won the Nobel Peace Prize. The last three decades, however, have seen a 
gradual decline praise for the ILO standards system. The system has been increasingly 
pressured by changing circumstances in the world of work. The systems strength of 
immutability quickly became a weakness, as work and employment had changed greatly 
from that of the 1930s when the system was consolidated. High structural unemployment, 
stagflation, multinational corporations and a huge increase in post-colonial independent 
states formed new features on the landscape that the system struggled to negotiate. 
Matters were not helped by an inaction on the part of the ILO, bom of self-satisfaction 
that its system was a model for all others.
By the 1980s, a weakened system was faced with the advent of global trade
liberalisation. The exponential rise in foreign direct investment and capital flows 
generally, the dismantling of trade barriers, the large advance in communications and 
transport technology in a short period and the accompanying trend towards non­
interventionist governance policies gradually robbed the ILO system of its strengths. The 
power of workers organisations have shrunk such that post-millennial unionisation rates 
are expected to drop to ten per cent of the workforce. The domestic public sector on 
which standards relied for their implementation likewise contracted. Governments 
themselves have become increasingly unable to control labour policy, as job-creating 
capital is now ‘foot loose’ and will relocate production to a low cost competitor with any 
hint that labour costs will rise. The (largely developing) countries who make up these low 
cost competitors are increasingly indisposed to ratifying ILO conventions, whose 
‘inflexible’ provisions they see as threatening their competitive advantage. In social rights 
areas where the ILO conventions incrementally built up worker benefit in correspondence 
with the construction of the post-war welfare state, member states were discovering that 
they could no longer afford to comply with ILO conventions on social security and
9
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pension benefits. More generally, they felt they could no longer afford the ream of other 
technical ILO conventions which were seen to hamper their international 
competitiveness.
Whether trade liberalisation is responsible for a general lowering of labour standards is a 
matter of current debate.28 One can find literature showing ‘empirically’ that trade 
liberalisation has or has not affected labour standards, as the case may.29 Whatever the 
case may be, trade liberalisation clearly has, in theory, the potential to undermine labour 
standards, at least in the short term.30 As outlined above trade liberalisation has also 
affected the means for regulation of labour issues through the setting of labour standards. 
The setting of labour standards at the national level has been attacked by the proponents 
of ‘flexibility’ in modes and conditions of work. It is argued that the lack of flexibility 
afforded by standards of national application prevents enterprises from adapting to the 
changes posed by the integrated world market. The alternative proposed is a regime 
whereby conditions of work are bargained after taking into account the geographic and
28 See, e,g., E. Lee, ‘Globalisation and labour standards: a review of the issues’, 136(2) 
International Labour Review (1997), 173; J. Williamson, ‘Globalisation, Labour Markets and 
Policy Backlash in the Past’, 12 Journal o f Economic Perspectives (1998), 51; B. Langille, Eight 
Ways to Think About Labour Standards and Globalization (Geneva, 1997); S. Chamovitz ‘Trade 
Employment and Labour Standards: the OECD Study and Recent Developments in the Trade and 
Labour Standards Debate’, 11 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, No. 1, 1997, 
131; Human Rights, Labour Rights and International Trade (eds. L. Compa and S. Diamond) 
(Philadelphia: Penn, 1996); G. Teeple, Globalization and the Decline o f Social Reform (Toronto: 
Garamond, 1995); W. Sengenberger and D. Campbell (eds) International Labour Standards and 
Economic Interdependence (Geneva: ILO, 1994).
29 See, for example, K. Maskus, Should Core Labour Standards be Imposed Through 
International Trade Policy, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1817, 
(Washington: World Bank, 1997); M. Slaughter and P. Swagel Does globalisation lower wages 
and export jobs?, (Washington, 1997); OECD, Employment and Labour Standards: A study o f 
core worker rights and international trade, (Paris: OECD, 1996) [hereafter ‘OECD Report’]; C. 
Murray, International Organisation and Industrial Change (Cambridge, Polity, 1994); ILO, 
Studies on the social aspects of globilization - Republic o f Korea and Chile (Geneva: ILO, 
1998); G. Atkinson, ‘The Political Economy of Liberalization and Regulation: Trade Policy and 
the New Era’, Vol. 32(2) (1998) Journal o f Economic Issues, p. 419; M. Allais, ‘The 
Liberalization of Trade and the European Community’s Experience’, Vol. 44 (1997) Rivista 
internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali, p. 465.
Much of the literature which finds trade liberalisation beneficial to labour standards relies on 
longer-term standard of living forecasts, assuming an eventual distribution of the wealth obtained 
from liberalised markets.
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financial position of the enterprise, the economic climate and worker expectations. It is 
claimed that governments in fact have no choice but to accept this situation as capital and 
jobs will simply leave the jurisdiction. Whether this is in fact the case or not is unclear.31 
However, it is a model that is increasingly followed by many governments, and in some 
cases (such as that of New Zealand) to the extreme.32 The result is a paring down of 
national labour codes to a small set of ‘core’ conditions. All other conditions of the 
employment relationship are either left entirely open to negotiation between employers 
and workers (often to the exclusion of collective representation) or are to be ‘reasonable’ 
in the circumstances.
These developments squarely challenge the ILO’s system of international labour 
standards. The Organisation is currently under pressure to respond. It is argued that in the 
first instance the Organisation has two options: either reform the standards system to 
adapt it to the changed circumstances; or move beyond standards as a means of regulating 
conditions of work world-wide. The Organisation is currently being considering two 
proposals as to how it should proceed. The first, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work, is an initiative devised and created within the ILO. The 
other, corporate codes of conduct, has grown outside of the Organisation and is now 
forcing its way onto the ILO’s agenda. This thesis proposes to look at each of these two 
proposals in turn considering: their effectiveness and limitations; and what their adoption 
might mean for the future of the ILO labour standards system.
31 See, e.g., M. Amiti, ‘Trade Liberalisation and the Location of Manufacturing Firms’. Vol. 21 
(1998) World Economy, p. 953 at 961; and G. Atkinson, ‘The Political Economy of 
Liberalization and Regulation: Trade Policy and the New Era’, Vol. 32(2) (1998), Journal o f 
Economic Issues, p. 419 at 425.
32 See A. Honeybone, ‘Introducing labour flexibility: The example of New Zealand’, Vol. 136(4) 
International labour review (1997), p. 493.

III. THE DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS 
AT WORK
L The background to the Declaration
The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (‘the Declaration’) 
forms the most far-reaching response of the ILO to the challenges of trade liberalisation 
outlined in the previous section. Seen from the approach of this thesis, it is the most 
important initiative in this area to have been generated from within the ILO, and as such 
forms the cornerstone of the proposed reforms of the Organisation that have been initiated 
by the new Director General.33
The origins of the Declaration lie in the general social clause debate. While proponents of 
the social clause directed their calls toward the WTO and other trade regime bodies, these 
organisations maintained that the issue of labour standards lay within the mandate of the 
ILO and could not be constitutionally dealt with in the trade sphere.34 35This position was 
supported by the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development of 12 March 1995 
which called on governments to respect worker rights through ‘ratification and full 
implementation of ILO conventions’, to use ‘existing international labour standards to 
guide the formulation of national labour legislation and policies’, and generally to 
promote ‘the role of ILO, particularly as regards improving the level of employment and 
the quality of work’.
" From 39 major programmes, the ILO’s work has been reorganised into four strategic 
objectives: Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; Employment; Social Protection; and 
Social Dialogue: Report o f the Director-General: Decent Work (Geneva: International Labour 
Office, 1999), p. 2 [hereafter, Decent Work]. Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
Employment is first mentioned and has been allocated 22% of the ILO budget for 2000-1 
allocated to Strategic Objectives: GB.274/PFA/9/2. (Programme and Budget Proposals for 2000- 
01).
34 World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Declaration, para. 4. WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W 13 
December 1996.
35 See Report of the World Summit for Social Development UN Doc. A/CONF. 166/9 paras 
54{c} (d) and (e) respectively.
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It is surprising (or perhaps indicative of the way in which the ILO functions) that these 
unambiguous calls for ILO action together with pressure from the Organisation’s own 
constituents (principally the workers and those member states pushing the social clause in 
other arena) did not produce a more timely and structured response from the 
Organisation. The first step came in 1994 with the then Director General’s report to the 
1994 ILC entitled Defending Values, promoting change. Social Justice in a global 
economy: An ILO Agenda. In this Report the Director-General outlined some of the 
challenges of globalisation, reiterated the relevance of the ILO in the modem world and, 
importantly, called for a ‘broader approach’ to the Organization’s standard-setting 
activities, which he called ‘our original vo cation and our strongest claim to fame*.36 7 38A 
feature of this broader approach was to be the promotion of ‘fundamental rights’ as a 
distinct goal of the ILO. In keeping with ILO practice to date, coercion as a tool for 
promoting these rights was rejected in favour of persuasion.39 Subsequently, the 
Governing Body set up a Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalisation of 
International Trade (WP/SDL) which was to co-ordinate these initiatives and develop 
others.40
36 A common response of the Office to such criticisms is that ‘the Organisation can only move jas 
fast as its member states allow’. That this formalistic response cannot be sustained in the real 
world of international organisations is clear not only from the experience of other organisations 
(take as examples the initiatives of the UNDP Administrator in the area of human rights beyond 
that formally sanctioned by the UNDP Executive Board and the Comprehensive Development 
Framework initiative of the current World Bank President (see http://www.worldbank.org/cdf/)), 
but also from the early history of the ILO itself. Originally conceived by its founding member 
states as essentially a research and statistical body, the ILO’s sphere of activity was unilaterally 
widened by Albert Thomas, its first Director General, to include, for example, direct liaison with 
and even lobbying of governments, the opening of regional office for this purpose: see E. Phelan, 
Yes and Albert Thomas (NY: Columbia, 1949), pp. 39-45. There is significant scope for more 
work on this area.
37 Defending Values, promoting change. Social Justice in a global economy: An ILO Agenda, 
(Geneva: ILO, 1994), p. 41.
38 Ibid., p. 51.
39 Ibid., p. 58.
40 At its first meeting the Working Party quickly became stymied by an acrimonious social clause 
debate: GB.261/11/31; interview with Mr Guy Ryder, Director, ACTRAV, ILO Geneva, 2 
November 1998. Also see Sharing Responsibilities for Labour Standards and Trade 
Liberalisation (Geneva: Quaker Office Geneva, 1998), p. 6.
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Four modest and largely unrelated initiatives were undertaken. First, the WP/SDL 
embarked on an overview of the work of other international organisations in the area of 
the social effects of globalisation.41 Second, in May 1995 the Director General launched a 
personal campaign for increased ratifications of the ‘fundamental’ ILO conventions, 
asking countries that had not done so to ratified all such conventions, to give a timetable 
for ratification or to say why ratification was not planned.42 Third, the Governing Body 
asked the Office for a report on how ILO supervisory mechanisms could be 
strengthened.43 Finally, WDSDL embarked on a series of country studies to study the 
social effects of globalisation and trade liberalisation on the attainment of the ILO’s 
social objects’.44
These disparate largely half-hearted efforts of the ILO became clearly inadequate after the 
December 1996 meeting of WTO trade ministers in Singapore. Having managed to 
include the issue of labour standards on the agenda of such a meeting for the first time, 
the United States and other proponents45 of a link between trade and labour standards 
failed to overcome the opposition of countries of the South after a highly charged 
meeting.46 The resulting Ministerial Declaration squarely put the task of addressing 
labour standard problems in the ILO’s arena:
The International Labour Organisation is the competent body to set and deal with 
[international labour] standards.47
Clearly unable to ignore such an unambiguous challenge,48 the Director General and the
41 GB.262/WP/SDUInf.4.
42 GB.262/LILS/4, For the latest results of the campaign see GB.274/LILS/5 para. 1.
43 GB.262/205 para. 40.
44 GB.267/WD/SDL/1/1. For a recent overview of this initiative see GB.274/WP/SDL/2.
45 In particular Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. See 
http://www.wto.org/wto/archives/wtodec.htm.
46 The level of sensitivity can be gauged from the fact that an invitation the ILO Director General 
to attend was withdrawn at the last minute: see GB.268/WP/SDL/1/3 para. 2.
47 World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Declaration, para. 4. WT/MIN{96)/DEC/W 13 
December 1996.
48 The imperative for action was clearly perceived by the Office (see L. Swepston ‘Introductory 
Note’ 37 ILM 1233 (1998), p. 1234), by the majority of the members of the Governing Body (see 
GB.270/3/2 para. 3: ‘Virtually all speakers considered that the time had come for a shift in the
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Office focussed a large part of their preparations for the 1997 1LC on the question of how 
the ILO would shore up support for international labour standards having been denied the 
possibility of a coercive link with trade privileges. In his report to the ILC of June 1997 
entitled The ILO, standard setting and globalization, then-Director General Michel 
Hansenne proposed to the Organisations* constituents two initiatives to respond to the 
W TO’s challenge. The first was that:
[a] declaration or any other text enshrining principles adopted by the Conference 
might help to define the universally acknowledged content of the fundamental 
rights which should be respected by all Members of the Organization, whether or 
not they have ratified the corresponding Conventions, and to establish a 
mechanism to guarantee their promotion.49
The second was the idea of a ILO-run; “global social labelling1* system that would allow 
member states to affix to products and services originating in their jurisdictions a label 
certifying that the product or service had been produced in accordance with fundamental 
ILO conventions.50 This latter proposal met with varying degrees of opposition from all 
of the tripartite constituents,51 523 but in particular from the employers who saw the 
proposal leading to “an internationally sanctioned means to implement a consumer 
boycott”. “ The employers group subsequently focused on the idea of a document that 
would ‘affirm’ member states’ obligations to respect ‘core rights’ using existing the ILO 
mandate and procedures. Other actors had problems with this initiative/ Why expend
emphasis of the ILO's standard-setting activities in the light of the globalization of the 
economy’), and by the employers:
Le but est de donner un signal que TOIT se reveille. On abandonne la clause sociale 
mais, l’OIT se mobilise autrement pour assurer que le progrès économique n’est pas la 
jungle: interview with Jean-Jacques Oechslin, former President Organisation 
international des employeurs 30 June 1998.
49 The ILO, standard setting and globalization: Report of the Director-General to the 
international Labour Conference 85th Session 1997, (Geneva: ILO, 1997), p. 26.
50 Ibid, p. 31.
51 See Reply by the Director-General of the International Labour Office to the discussion of his 
Report, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/lQilc/ilc85/dgrep.htm and GB.270/3/2 paras 8-10.
52 See http://www.uscib.org/news/pressrel.htm.
53 The most strident having problems with both proposals: ‘We are therefore compelled to state 
in unequivocal terms that the idea of a declaration and that of the overall social label are not 
acceptable’: Submission of the Pakistani Employer’s delegate during the Discussion of the
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energy on a instrument which merely outlines what member states are already obliged to 
do? If it is still not linked to trade sanctions then how will it further the social clause 
debate? And how will this new instrument fit into the ILO standards system? Would not a 
new follow-up mechanism raise the possibility of a country being subject to ‘double 
scrutiny’* 54 on the same issue?
Despite these reservations the initiative was placed on the agenda for the 1998 ILC by the 
Governing Body and negotiations of the text commenced under the stewardship of 
Canada. The debate on the draft text of the Declaration at the 1998 ILC highlighted 
divisions in the Organisation’s constituency: general support for a ‘reaffirmation’ of 
members’ obligations arising from membership of the ILO, but a strong rejection by a 
group of member states (led by Egypt and Pakistan) of any new monitoring mechanism or 
any possibility that the Declaration could be used as a basis for any punitive trade 
action.55 These divisions will be relevant to the discussion below. The contention of the 
debate in the plenary session is reflected in the fact that the Declaration was adopted on 
the positive vote of only 38 per cent of eligible delegates.56 Nonetheless, since its 
adoption on 18 June 1998, the Declaration has been regarded (at least by the Office) as 
the third principle instrument of the ILO after the Organisation’s constitution and its 
quasi-constitutive Declaration of Philadelphia.57
Report of the Director-General.
54 Ms. Janjua (Government adviser, Pakistan), Report of the Committee on the Declaration of 
Principles Committee report Declaration Submission, discussion and adoption, [hereafter 
‘Declaration Committee: Submission, discussion and adoption*]. This document can be obtained 
at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/10ilc/ilc86/com-decd.htm.
55 See the comments of the Egyptian Minister of Manpower in Declaration Committee: 
Submission, discussion and adoption.
56 Of a total number of 696 voting delegates, the quorum of 264 was surpassed by only 52 
members (316). Although no delegate voted against the text, of the 316 votes cast, 43 were 
abstentions (including government delegates of Myanmar, Syria, Vietnam, Peru, Mexico, Egypt, 
Kuwait Pakistan and Saudi Arabia): ibid. p. 30.
57 The 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia had the effect of widening the Constitutional foundation 
of the competence of the Organisation. It was incorporated into the ILO Constitution on the 
occasion of the constitutional amendments of 1946.
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2. What the Declaration purports to do
In operative terms the Declaration purports to achieve four things. The first is to declare 
that certain labour rights are to be considered as ‘fundamentar or ‘core’ by the ILO and 
its membership. The four such ‘fundamental rights and principles’ are: (a) freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining (which are 
taken as being mutually reinforcing); (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. The choice of these rights is 
said to be based on the fact that these they have been expressed in ILO conventions which 
are ‘recognized as fundamental both inside and outside the Organisation’.58
The second is the extension of the obligation to respect.and promote these ‘fundamental 
rights’ to member states of the Organization that have not ratified the ILO conventions 
which deal with these rights. This extension is said to be based on the Constitution of 
Organization (including the Declaration of Philadelphia) which is said to embody these 
principles. By the voluntary act of joining the Organization and accepting its Constitution, 
member states are taken to have also accepted the obligation to observe and promote the 
‘fundamental rights and principles’ recognised in the constitutive instruments. Hence, 
rather than being a new obligation, the Declaration presupposes that this obligation has 
always existed and thus the constitutes merely a reaffirmation of the position.
The third feature of the Declaration is the establishment of a follow-up mechanism ‘to 
encourage the efforts made by the Members ... to promote the fundamental principles and 
rights’ identified in the Declaration. A framework of the follow-up mechanism is set out 
in the Annex to the Declaration, the details of which were left to be decided by the 
Governing Body. The nature of the follow-up procedure is repeatedly stated to be 
‘promotional’. In line with this ‘promotionality’, the results of the procedure are to be 
used in identifying areas where the ILO’s assistance ‘may prove useful’ to members
58 Article 1(b).
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striving to respect the fundamental rights.
The follow-up is to consist of two reporting procedures. The first focuses on member 
states which have not ratified the seven conventions which are said to embody the 
fundamental rights and principles. These members will be asked to report annually on
‘efforts made in accordance with the Declaration’,59 that is, their efforts to promote and
/
realise the fundamental rights ./These reports (‘the Annual Reports’) -  together with 
comments on them by domestic social partners - will be compiled by the Office before 
being reviewed by the Governing Body, with the opportunity for the member states 
concerned to respond to requests for clarification or further information. ih e  procedure is 
said to be based on an existing procedure under Article 19.5(e) of the ILO Constitution 
which allows the Governing Body to request reports from member states on progress 
made towards ratification of as yet unratified conventions, including difficulties which 
prevent or delay the ratification of such a convention. A departure from this established 
procedure is the possibility, under the Declaration, for the Governing Body to appoint a 
‘group of experts’ for the purpose of ‘presenting an introduction’ to the Annual Reports 
as compiled by the Secretariat and ‘drawing attention to any aspects which might call for 
a more in-depth discussion’.60
While the Annual Reports are country specific, the second follow-up procedure is rights- 
specific. The ‘Global Reports’ are to aim at providing a ‘dynamic global picture’ of each 
fundamental right, to then be used as a basis for determining priorities for technical 
assistance within the ILO/Each year one of the four fundamental rights will be addressed, 
starting in 2000 with Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining.61 
The report will be drawn up by the Office, based on information gleaned from (a) the
59 Annex Article II. A. 2. The seven relevant Conventions are those on the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87), Right to 
Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) .Forced Labour Convention, 
1930 (No. 29), Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. Il l ) ,  Equal Remuneration Convention, 
1951 (No. 100), and Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138).
60 Annex Article II. B. 3.
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Annual Reports of non-ratifying countries, (b) the established ILO reporting procedure for 
states that have ratified the relevant conventions,62 and (c) other information ‘gathered 
and assessed in accordance with established procedures’.63 Unlike the Annual Report, the 
Global Report is to be reviewed by the ILC.
A fourth feature of the Declaration is its attempt to characterise its last two-mentioned 
functions (that is, the extension of convention obligations to non-ratifying states and the 
follow-up procedure) as being ‘promotional’ rather than comparative or punitive.64 This 
position was laboured in the preparations for the Declaration,65 during the Committee and 
plenary debates on the draft tex t66 and in the subsequent Governing Body debates on the 
format of the follow-up mechanism. This feature was born of the view that the 
Declaration should neither: '
(1) lead to a new monitoring mechanism for legal obligations but rather focus on
targeting ILO assistance to countries attempting to achieve ratification of all 
fundamental conventions; nor
(2) facilitate, in the future, any attempt to condition access to international markets on 
maintenance of a certain level of labour conditions.
This latter view is articulated in Article 5 of the Declaration:
5. [The International Labour Conference] stresses that labour standards should not 
be used for protectionist trade purposes, and that nothing in this Declaration and its
61 GB.274/205 para.6.
62 Article 22 of the ILO Constitution obliges all ratifying member states to submit periodic 
reports on measures the state has taken to give effect to the provisions of each ratified convention 
See t.a.n. 16. The Governing Body has recently amended the timetable for the delivery of reports 
under Article 22 so that they arrive in time to be used in the preparation of the Global Reports: 
GB.274/LILS/3/1 para. 8; GB.274/10/1 and GB.274/205 para. 39. See the further discussion in 
Part 3.3 below. The sequence for consideration of Global Reports follows the order or 
fundamental rights as set out in the Declaration: GB.274/205 para. 6.
63 Annex Article III. B. 1.
64 Articles 4 and 1.2.
65 See, e.g., GB.270/3/1 paras 25,26 and 28.
66 See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Declaration of Principles paras 21,22 and 37.
67 See, e.g., GB .273/3, paras 15 and 16.
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follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used for such purposes; in addition, the 
comparative advantage of any country should in no way be called into question by 
this Declaration and its follow-up.
Originally seen as an optional clause, a bloc o f developing member states (led by Pakistan 
and Egypt) successfully argued for its inclusion.68 Article 5 provides a textual link 
between the Declaration and the WTO Singapore Declaration in that its second limb 
adopts the wording of the WTO Singapore Declaration.69
The notion of a promotional rather than obligatory regime will be discussed in detail in 
the next section.
3. A critical evaluation of the Declaration
At the time of writing, the Declaration is a little over one year old. It is still a novel 
document even within the ILO, and little critical analysis has been published.70 The aim 
of this section is to critically evaluate the Declaration in terms of what its purported 
aims are (base on the text alone) and in terms of what the ILO and its constituents have 
defined as its goals. The succeeding part will evaluate the Declaration in terms of the 
ILO’s system of international labour standards and the Organisation’s mandate.
68 Consideration o f a possible Declaration o f principles o f the International Labour 
Organization concerning fundamental rights and its appropriate follow-up mechanism, 
International Labour Office, (Geneva, 1998), p. 37 [hereafter ‘the Office Background Paper’]; 
Declaration Committee: Submission, discussion and adoption, pp. 18, 27, 30.
69 ‘We reject the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the 
comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way 
be put in question.’ World Trade Organisation, Ministerial Declaration, para. 4. 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W 13 December 1996.
70 E. McKeon, Worker Rights in the Global Economy (NY: UNA-USA, 1999), pp. 53-57; 
Sharing Responsibilities for Labour Standards and Trade Liberalisation (Geneva: Quaker Office 
Geneva, 1998); R. Howse, ‘The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' 
Rights’, Voi.3 No. 1 Journal Of Small and Emerging Business Law (1999) p. 131; M. Rodriguez 
Pinero-Royo, Editorial, Relaciones Laborales, 1999.
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a. Problems associated with recognising certain rights as fundamental
The Declaration is built around the notion that certain labour rights and principles are 
fundamental, and as such, these are to be distinguished from other labour rights and 
principles regulating work. This notion promotes the adoption of a hierarchy of rights in 
the field of labour regulation, with the right to organise being accorded ‘fundamental’ 
status while, for example, a right to compensation under the Shipowners' Liability (Sick 1
7 / Iand Injured Seamen) Convention is seen as a non-fundamental or ‘technical* right.J 
While it cannot be said that every right enunciated in the international labour code can be 
said to be a fundamental or human right,72 nor is it clear that only the four rights outlined 
in the Declaration are able to be described as fundamental rights, to the exclusion of all 
others.
The way in which the set of fundamental labour rights is defined is not just crucial to the 
protection of those rights themselves, but to the whole ILO system of international 
labour regulation. If the set of ‘core’ rights is too wide (that is, it encompasses rights that 
might better be described as procedural or technical rights) then the international labour 
code is weakened. If one technical right receives greater protection and promotion than 
another, there is an inevitable downgrading of the importance o f the other, if for no other 
reason than once a right is declared fundamental, it is immune from the critical review to 
which all rights in all ILO conventions are systematically subjected.73 A hierarchy among 
non-fundamental labour rights has been expressly rejected by ILO.74 If the ‘core set’ is 
too narrow (and thus excludes what might be seen as a truly fundamental right) then the 
according o f special status to the core set raises two difficulties. The first derives from the
71 ILO Convention No. 55 (1936). 4
72 V. Leary ‘The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights’ in Human Rights, Labour Rights 
and International Trade, eds. L. Compa and S. Diamond (Philadelphia: Penn, 1996), p. 28.
73 Revisions of conventions and recommendations are regularly carried out by the ILO to take 
into account changing circumstances. The current revision, carried out by the Working Party on 
Policy regarding the Revision of Standards, is almost complete. See GB.274/4(Rev. 1).
74 GB. 199/9/22.
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notion that fundamental or basic labour rights constitute human rights.75 If the ‘core set’ 
is too narrow and excludes a right which is acknowledged outside the ILO as a human 
right (for example the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation76) 
then the damage to both the interdependence and the universality of human rights would 
extend well beyond the ILO system.
A second difficulty this situation would pose is linked to the first. The vision o f Director 
General Hansenne of the role of the Declaration was to settle certain immutable and non- 
negotiable standards in the ‘jungle’ of globalisation. This is articulated in the preamble to 
the Declaration:
Whereas it is urgent, in a situation of growing economic interdependence, to 
reaffirm the immutable nature of the fundamental principles and rights embodied 
in the Constitution o f the Organization and to promote their universal application
The implication is that other rights and standards laid down in the international labour 
code are negotiable and may change over time. This implication is reinforced by recent 
constitutional changes within the ILO. Although a ratifying member state has always 
been able (subject to certain timetable conditions) to denounce a convention, only lately 
has the ILC itself been empowered to withdraw or abrogate conventions.77 Much of 
impetus for this change comes from the campaign to revise and rationalise ILO 
conventions which has been pursued by the ILO at the urging of its constituents.78 Taken 
together, these views suggest a consensus that the future of international labour standards
75 Valticos & von Potobsky, pp. 127-129.
76 See Article 32, Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA Res.44/25 of 20.11.89.
77 See Provisional Record Nos 15 and 15A, ILC 85,h Session and GB.270/LILS/1. A convention 
is withdrawn if no ratifications have been registered, abrogated if otherwise. There are other 
ways in which a convention can be abrogated, for example, pursuant to its own terms.
78 See International Organisation of Employers, Position paper: Proposals for a thorough reform 
of the ILO (February 1993) paras 15 and 16; How to Achieve Labour Standards, Statement of the 
Non-Aligned Movement Geneva, 10 June 1997; Frances Williams, ‘The ILO feels its age’, 
Financial Times 2 June 1998 and ‘Soft Bark and not Much of a Bite: Examining the Growing 
Debate over the Effectiveness and Priorities of the ILO’, Financial Times, 2 June 1993 . As a 
result of such views in the Governing Body, the Working Party on Policy regarding the Revision 
of Standards was set up in March 1996 with a mandate to propose reforms of the process for 
revision of standards: GB.267/LILS/WP/PRS/2, Annex.
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lie in a system of non-negotiable core standards and flexible non-fundamental 
standards.79 8012If this prophecy is true then a narrow set o f core standards which excluded 
certain human rights and left them in the sphere of flexible or negotiable standards, would 
start off the new system on a flawed basis and have a grave effect on the protection of all 
labour rights, which will increasingly be seen to flow from this core set..
How valid are the criteria by which the four rights set out in the Declaration have been 
chosen as being fundamental? Has their choice been to the exclusion of other 
fundamental rights? It is not immediately apparent from the text of the Declaration how 
the four fundamental rights have been chosen. They are said to be based on certain 
‘principles and rights set out in [the] Constitution and in the Declaration of Philadelphia* 
and in certain ILO conventions, the latter having been ‘recognized as fundamental both 
inside and outside the Organization*. Problems with each of these bases which will be 
discussed below.
Within the field of international labour regulation, the idea that certain labour rights are 
more fundamental than others is not new. The ILO itself maintains a classification of its 
conventions and recommendations under 13 categories, of which ‘basic human rights 
instruments’ is the first. Indeed, according to the Governing Body, ‘[t]here has been 
informal agreement on the question o f what are the fundamental rights ... since at least 
the 1960s’y  However, before advent of the Declaration, the ELO’s catalogue of 
fundamental rights ran to three, child labour being excluded. This contrasted with
79 This would certainly accord with the current neoliberal economic call for flexibility in
employment conditions:
[L]abour flexibility has found near universal acceptance as a panacea for the assumed 
inefficiency of Australian workplaces and preexisting forms of labour market regulation 
and come to dominate debates concerning the future of industrial relations policy. 
Indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the ’imperative’ of labour flexibility has 
become an article of faith among employers, governments and unions.
Employment security (eds. R. McCallum, G. McCarry, P. Ronfeldt) (Sydney : Federation Press, 
1994), p.7.
80 See Classified guide to international labour standards, (Geneva, 1995).
81 GB.267/LILS/5 para. 16 which refers to GB. 148/9/8.
82 In the Governing Body ‘there a clear understanding ... that the three principal human rights
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approaches taken outside the Organisation. While other commentators and organisations 
have promoted the idea that certain labour rights, such as the right to freedom of 
association, are rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
should be regarded in a manner different from other labour rights, for example a right to a 
certain level of remuneration in a specific sector of industry,* 83 there has been little 
consensus.
At the inclusive end of this spectrum, basic labour rights are said to include all labour 
related rights appearing in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two 
international human rights covenants.84 856This definition would include: the right not to be 
subjected to forced lahonr. the right to work, thefoght to just and favourable conditions of 
work (including fair wages and safe and healthy working conditions), the right to equal 
pay for equal work, the right to form trade unions, the right to rest and leisure and 
reasonable limitation of working hours, and the right to protection against unemployment. 
A more x c lu s iv e  v ie ^  would include just freedom of association and a prohibition on ■ 
forced labour, the reasoning being that these principles enjoy the widest consensus, that 
differing levels of development or resources among societies should not affect their 
application and that with a freedom to associate, other rights can be secured. Between 
these extremes, the contents of cores sets varied widely. Some commentators included 
child labour but also include workplace health and safety. Yet others restricted child 
labour to exploitative child labour.87 Even an internal ILO working party was inconsistent 
in including child labour but excluding non-discrimination. Further, the content of 
individual rights was often unclear, as we shall see later in respect to freedom of 
association and child labour.
with which the ILO was concerned were freedom of association, discrimination and forced 
labour’: GB.267/LILS/5 footnote 14.
83 See G. Fields, Trade and Labour Standards: a review o f the issues (Paris: Pedone, 1994); 
OECD Report.
84 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN Doc. A/RES/2200).
85 Leary, ‘The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights’, p. 38.
86 Fields, 1994.
87 OECD Report, p.26.
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In positioning itself in this debate, the ILO itself constrained in two (related) ways. First, 
it felt itself bound to not stray beyond fundamental rights on which there was a high 
degree of consensus stretching beyond the Organisation. Second, it also claimed that the 
method it chose of ‘declaring* the ‘fundamentally* of rights depended on the rights 
themselves having been entrenched jn  the Organisation’s constitution. Both of these 
perceived limitations appear suspect and they will be examined below and in Part 3.
In arriving at the set of core rights in the Declaration, the ILO was heavily influenced by 
three documents, and it is on these three documents that the assertion in the Declaration 
that certain ILO conventions are ‘recognized as fundamental both inside and outside the 
Organization’ is based.8 9 90'Çhe first)is the Declaration of the World Summit for Social 
Development of 12 March 1995 in which, as outlined above, 190 member states of the 
United Nations (including almost all ILO member states) committed themselves to ‘freely 
promote respect for relevant International Labour Organization conventions, including 
those on the: prohibition of forced and child labour, the freedom of association, the right 
to organise and bargain collectively, and the principle of non-discrimination*.9^ T h e  
seconçP was the 1996 report by the OECD Secretariat, Employment and Labour 
Standards: A study o f core worker rights and international trade which, after considering 
the various definitions of fundamental rights, arrived at the set which appears in the 
Declaration (though focusing on exploitative child labour rather than child labour per se).
88 GB.261/WP/SDL/1 (November 1994).
89 Emphasis added. See the Office Background Paper, pp. 12-15.
90 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development of 12 March 1995, Commitment 3(i). 
Likewise Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development of 12 March 1995the summit’s 
Programme of Action called on Governments to ‘enhance the quality of work and employment 
by: ... (b) Safeguarding and promoting respect for basic workers’ rights, including the prohibition 
of forced labour and child labour, freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain 
collectively, equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value, and non­
discrimination in employment, fully implementing the conventions of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) in the case of States parties to those conventions, and taking into account the 
principles embodied in those conventions in the case of those countries that are not States parties 
to thus achieve truly sustained economic growth and sustainable development.’ An issue arises as 
to whether non-discrimination covers the notion of equal work for equal value and if so, why it is 
mentioned separately in the Copenhagen Summit documents but not in the Declaration.
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The^hirdtjwas the Singapore Ministerial Declaration of the WTO Trade Ministers of 13 
December 199691 which recognised that the ‘ILO is the competent body to set and deal’ 
with ‘internationally recognised core labour standards’. These standards are not set out, 
but the phrase is accepted to refer to the Copenhagen Summit Declaration and 
Programme of Action.
Another factor in the choice of fundamental rights was thejevel of ratification of the 
related ILO conventions. The six o f the seven fundamental conventions on which the 
Declaration is built are among the most ratified of all ILO conventions. The seven 
together have registered 853 ratifications, on average 70 percent of member states having 
ratified each convention. Universal ratification would require only 356 further 
ratifications.92 93Indeed, this was the basis for the Director General’s personal campaign for 
universal ratification of these seven conventions, a campaign which explicitly acted on
* 93the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action.
Hence it is convincingly argued by the ILO94 that the four fundamental rights appearing 
in the Declaration reflect, if not a universal consensus, then a consensus among ILO 
member states. At first this might been seen as a dynamic approach, in which further 
rights can be declared fundamental as consensus moves forward. However the adoption 
of a ‘Declaration’ containing four specific and limited rights (compared to a 
comprehensive list in, for example, the Universal Declaration) will more likely retard any 
progress in consensus in the short term. The Declaration will no doubt provide a platform- )
91 ‘We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour 
standards. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal 
with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them. We believe that 
economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further trade liberalisation 
contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour standards for 
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low- 
wage developing countries, must in no way be put in question. In this regard we note that the 
WTO and the ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration.’ World Trade 
Organisation, Ministerial Declaration, para. 4. WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W 13 December 1996.
92 Report o f the Director General: Activities o f the ILO 1998-99 (Geneva, 1999) p.2.
93 Report of the Director General: Activities o f the ILO 1994-95 (Geneva, 1996) p. 8-9.
94 Office Background Paper, pp. 12-15.
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from which the acceptance of new fundamental rights can be secured in the future. But 
the document will also provide a ready answer for those seeking to frustrate such an
extension for some time.
 ^ _
/ '
/Even if we accept that the core set of rights contained in the Declaration reflects a 
contemporary consensus, differences still exist concerning the substantive content of each 
of these four rights which could impact of the way in which the Declaration works in 
practice. Some may not be very contentious. For example the question of whether the 
omission of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value means that this principle is 
not seen as fundamental, or whether it is adequately covered by the principle of non­
discrimination in employment (the two had earlier been distinguished both within and 
outside the ILO95). More contentious are the question of freedom of association and the 
question of child labour. Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are 
seen by some to include the right to strike, and by others to exclude the right to strike. 
The international consensus on which the Declaration is based does not assist in 
deciding whether the right to strike forms part of the fundamental principle of freedom 
of association.96 97This issue will be discussed in greater detail in next section.
* The child labour issue is part of a broader debate currently taking place in the ILO, and 
hence the approach of the Declaration is very important in judging the future direction of 
the broader debate. In essence the issue is whether the work of people below a certain age 
is to be prohibited altogether, or whether some flexibility should be introduced to take 
into account non-exploitative child labour and avoid the adverse effects of a blanket 
proscription (for example the forcing of children from legitimate employment into 
prostitution and the unregulated parallel economy). Before the adoption of the
95 See note 90 above.
96 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressly recognises the 
right to strike in the provision dealing with freedom of association (Article 8.1).
97 The literature is vast. See A. Lefebvre Islam, human rights and child labour in Pakistan 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Books , 1995); M. Black, In the twilight zone child workers in the hotel, 
tourism and catering industry, (Geneva: ILO, 1995); International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, Breaking down the wall o f silence how to combat child labour (Brussels: The
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Declaration, the ILO had promoted the ‘elimination’ of child labour,* 98 while, for 
example, the OECD Report adopted a proscription on ‘exploitative* child labour.99 10While 
the use of the phrase ‘effective abolition of child labour’ in the Declaration may represent 
a compromise between the two views, the records of debate on the Declaration in the
i noconference show that it is intended to focus on exploitative forms of labour. 
Considering this debate, it is not clear that the inclusion of ‘effective abolition of child 
labour’ reflects the consensus on which the Declaration is based, certain (notably 
Northern) member states seeing the fundamental principle as being the elimination of 
child labour. One might o f course see the outcome as being the lowest common 
denominator.
This uncertainty regarding the contents o f the fundamental rights is exacerbated by the 
way in which the Declaration links rights to specific ILO conventions.
b. Linking rights to the conventions: do the conventions reflect the rights or the 
rights reflect the conventions?
The idea that the four rights set out in the Declaration reflect a consensus on labour rights 
which are also human rights is weakened by the introduction of references to ILO 
conventions. For while the obligation placed on the membership is to ‘respect ... the 
principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of those 
conventions’,101 the ‘fundamental rights’ themselves are defined by reference to ILO 
conventions. Thus Article 1(b) states that the fundamental rights and principles set out in
i
l the Constitution:
l
| ... have been expressed and developed in the form of specific rights and obligations
\ in Conventions recognized as fundamental both inside and outside the
Confederation, 1985); J. Boyden, B. Ling and W. Myers, What Works for Working Children, 
(Florence: UNICEF/Radda Bamen, 1998).
98 GB.261/WP/SDL/1 (November 1994).
99 OECD Report, p. 26.
100 Declaration Committee: Submission, discussion and adoption, p. 3 (Amb. Moher).
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Organization.
This shift from ‘fundamental rights’ simplicitér to fundamental rights as defined by the 
ILO conventions underpins the balance of the document and the follow-up mechanism. 
Hcncc, the obligation to assist members placed on the ILO in Article 3 is focused on 
assistance with the goal of ratification of the relevant conventions. Similarly, the follow­
up mechanism is based on reporting procedures in respect of the specific conventions, 
rather than just the fundamental rights.
The confusion thus introduced is whether all rights contained in the seven relevant ILO 
conventions are now to be considered fundamental. Some rights conferred by the 
conventions (or through their practice) might well go further than the four fundamental 
rights outlined in Article 2 of the Declaration. A clear example is ILO Convention 87 on 
the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention. This 
Convention stipulates that workers must have the right to establish and join organisations 
of their own choosing. It goes on to lay down the rights of these organisations to draw 
their own constitutions, formulate programmes, elect officers etc. A member state which 
agrees with the fundamental right to freedom of association would be hard pressed to 
argue that these rights contained in the Convention go further than the fundamental right. 
However both the Committee on Freedom of Association (the Convention’s supervisory 
body) and the Committee of Experts (which oversees ILO conventions as a whole) 
consider that, with certain exceptions, the right to strike forms an integral part o f the 
rights conferred by this convention. The Convention itself is silent on the question of * 
the right to strike. Thus in defining the right of freedom of association by reference to, 
inter alia, Convention 87, the Declaration may well extend ‘fundamental’ status to the 
right to strike. That this outcome would not be supported by many member states is 
evidenced by the continuing resistance of many governments to the two committees’ 
reading of Convention 87.* 103
See Rep. Com. Exp. 1994 Chapter V; Digest of Decisions o f the Freedom o f Association 
Committee o f the Governing Body o f the ILO (Geneva, 1985); Valticos & von Potobsky, p. 98.
103 See Ben-Israel, pp. 64-70; J. Hodges-Aeberhard, and A. Odero De Dios, ‘Principles of the 
Committee on Freedom of Association concerning strikes’, 126 International Labour Review, p.
29
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Perhaps more acutely, the problem has arisen again (but this time after the adoption o f the 
Declaration) with the adoption by the 1999 ILC of the Convention concerning the 
prohibition and immediate action fo r  the elimination o f the worst forms o f child labour 
(Convention No. 182) and the accompanying Recommendation (Recommendation 190). 
This Convention does not replace the earlier ILO convention dealing with child labour 
{Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (Convention 138)), but contributes to the child labour 
debate by identifying those areas of child labour that should be proscribed without 
delay.* 104 These can be summarised as being (a) forced or compulsory labour, (b) 
prostitution or the production of pornography, (c) use for illicit activities, in particular for 
the production and trafficking of drugs, and (d) work likely to harm the health, safety or 
morals of children.
One would imagine these principles would clearly fall within the Declaration's call for 
the ‘effective abolition of child labour’ (even more so than those contained in 
Convention 138)105 and that the seven conventions on which the Declaration is based 
would henceforth be eight. This was the view of many governments in recommending 
Convention 182 to the ILC for adoption.106 However this is not, for the moment, the case.
37; P. Hoefer-Van Dongen, ‘The right to strike within the framework of the ILO’, Netherlands 
Int’l L. Rev. (Special Issue 1/2) pp. 109-119 (1977); Valticos & von Potobsky, p. 308.
104 Convention 138 obliges states to set a minimum age for entry into the workforce as part of ‘a 
national policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labour’: Article 1. States 
cannot set a minimum age below 14 years for entry into the workforce (Articles 4 and 5). In light 
of the definition of child as a person under the age of 18 years in both Convention 182 and the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (GA Res. 44/25), Convention 138 cannot be seen to 
impose an absolute obligation on states to abolish child labour.
105 See the opinion of the ILO Legal Advisor during the debate on the Declaration at the ILC:
‘The Legal Adviser stated again that the expression 'effective abolition of child labour' could, and 
must be, understood in a promotional and progressive sense which was indeed also reflected in 
the definition of Article 1 of Convention No. 138 to the extent that the Convention itself 
recognized that certain forms of child labour did not fall within its scope or might be excluded in 
certain circumstances. It was clear a fortiori that the Declaration did not require Members to 
eliminate such forms of child labour or similar forms’. Declaration Committee: Submission, 
discussion and adoption, p. 2.
106 See Report o f the Committee on Child Labour paras 18, 30 39 and 44; Declaration 
Committee: Submission, discussion and adoption (Statements by the Governments of the 
Netherlands and Denmark).
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The only textual link between the Declaration and Convention 182 appears in the 
preambular paragraph of Convention 182 that merely ‘recalls’ the Declaration. The 
preparations for the coming into force of the Declaration’s follow-up mechanism have not 
once addressed the issue of Convention 182. It may be argued that until Convention 182 
was adopted in June 1998, there was little sense in considering its effect on the 
Declaration. However considering the fact that Convention 182 attracted an extraordinary 
level of consensus such that it is one of the rare ILO conventions which was negotiated 
over two years without one record vote having to be called, it would seem wilfully short­
sighted to ignore it in the construction of the Declaration machinery.
l
Worse, as it stands, there will be some difficulty in incorporating Convention 182 into 
this machinery. The Global Report under the Declaration follow-up procedure will 
address child labour in 2002.107 108To ensure they are taken into account in this report, the 
scheduled periodical reports under Article 22 from member states on Convention 138 
have been brought forward to 2000. No similar provision has been made for Article 22 
reports on Convention 182, and hence there will be no information on the areas covered 
by Convention 182 in the 2002 Global Report on Child Labour. It is true that Convention 
182 will only come into force 12 months after ratification by two member states, and 
that to schedule reports before the convention is even in force might be seen to be foolish. 
Again, however, Convention 182 is no normal convention. It is the first convention 
dealing with fundamental rights to be adopted in over twenty years,109 and, as a 
consequence of the high level of consensus it attracted as outlined above, it is also 
expected to quickly achieve a high rate of ratifications. Immediate ratification was urged 
by both employers and workers,110 while many governments representatives111 undertook 
to commence the ratification process as soon as practicable, most notably President
lü/ See t.a.n. 61.
108 Article 10(2).
109 The last was the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (C151) which deals 
with public employees’ right to organise.
110 See the comments of the Employer and Worker Vice-Chairpersons of the Committee on Child 
Labour, Submission, discussion and adoption , 1999ILC Geneva.
111 In particular, Switzerland, Denmark and Germany.
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Clinton the United States. In these circumstances, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the convention will soon achieve the required two ratifications for entry into force. The 
Governing Body’s failure to schedule the first Global Report on Child labour until 2004 
or even 2003 to allow for Convention 182 matters to be considered seems to indicate that 
Convention 182 is not considered to be a fundamental convention.
The view of the Office, however, is that the Declaration, bind states in relation to 
principles rather than conventions. Discussing these principles in an introductory note to 
the text of the Declaration published in International Legal Materials, a senior ILO 
fonctionnaire wrote:
This does not mean that the Conventions the ILO has adopted to develop these 
principles will be extended to member states which have not ratified them. It 
means rather that States have an obligation to pursue the realization of principles 
in ways appropriate to their own situation, and to report regularly on how they do
" so-" 3 ..
Likewise, the Office has suggested that the ILC Standing Orders be amended to 
accommodate the discussion of the Annual Report envisaged by the Declaration. This is 
because the relevant provision in the Standing Orders currently refers to a discussion of 
information ‘concerning Conventions and Recommendations’.114 According to the Office, 
because the Annual Reports contain information relating to the fundamental rights rather 
than ‘Conventions and Recommendations’, an amendment is required.115
But the views of the Office are not definitive of the current position, and certainly do not 
necessarily foresee how the Declaration will work in practice. It is instructive to look 
deeper into the genesis of the Declaration. In Part 3 we saw that both the Declaration and 
ILO engagement of private initiatives was grounded in the Director General Hansenne’s
112 See the text of President Clinton’s address to the ILC at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/10ilc/ilc87/a-clinto.htm. President Clinton transmitted 
Convention 182 to the US Senate for ratification on 9 August 1999 (M2 Presswire, August 10, 
1999).
1.3 Swepston, ILM .
1.4 Article 7, paragraph 1(b), of the Conference Standing Orders.
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1994 call for a strengthening of supervisory procedures in the face of globalisation.15 16 The 
Director General’s initial suggestion, which was subsequently the subject of Office 
research,117 *was the extension of the full Freedom of Association supervisory mechanism 
to the issues of forced labour and discrimination, on the grounds that these two rights ‘are 
fundamental principles of the ILO, akin to the principle of freedom of association’. It 
was accepted that, from a legal point of view, this could be achieved on the same 
reasoning as was subsequently used in extending obligations from the constitutive 
documents in the Declaration. After considerable research and debate, this option was not 
followed by the Governing Body, but evolved into the Declaration after member states 
refused to countenance new supervisory mechanisms.119 It is far from clear that this 
evolution shifted the basis of the obligation from rights in conventions to rights reflected 
in conventions.
One might also consider the distinction the Declaration makes between member states 
that have ratified all core conventions and those that have not. Thoseavha have ratified 
all seven conventipns, are not required to submit an Annual Report, the reasoning being 
that their regular periodic reports under Article 22 of the ILO Constitution provide a 
sufficient method for supervising their activities in the given area. If the fundamental 
principles being reported on in the Annual Reports are in any way different from, the 
rights contained in the core conventions, then the Declaration cannot be seen to be 
pursuing its aim of universal ratification of the core conventions, and indeed could 
significantly weaken the international labour code. To explain, let us take the example of 
the principle of freedom of association and the right to strike discussed above. If. the 
fundamental principles are narrower than the scope of the rights in the core conventions 
(so that the principle of freedom of association does not include the right to strike), then, 
the Annual Report system will not be able to inquire into a member state’s respect of the
115 GB.274/LILS/3/1 paras 9-13.
116 See t.a.n. 37.
117 GB.264/6.
1.8 GB.267/LILS/5 para. 3.
1.9 ‘[T]he existing mechanism on freedom of association is by no means the only model for the 
promotion of fundamental rights.’: GB.267/9/2 para. 48(5).
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right to strike. Whereas if the member state has ratified the core convention, its respect of 
the right to strike will be covered in its periodic Article 22 report. This raises the 
following incongruous situation. The fundamental principle of freedom of association 
means different things according to whether or not the member state in question has 
ratified the relevant core convention. This contradicts the Declaration’s constitutional 
basis that all members by reason of their freely joining the ILO, are bound to recognise 
(amongst other) the principle of freedom of association. If a member state is deemed to be 
reporting on respect of this principle by submitting Annual Reports under the Declaration, 
then there is little incentive for that state to ratify the core convention, if all that 
ratification brings about is an extra obligation to respect and report on the right to strike. /
It is not being suggested that the Declaration follow-up mechanism will place on member 
states the same reporting obligations as they have in relation to conventions they have 
ratified. However, it appears that it is unclear what role the fundamental conventions play 
in the scheme of the Declaration, and that this uncertainty could be used to expand the 
definition of the fundamental principles that member states are being asked to honour. 
The issue of the right to strike outlined above is but one example. The confused issue of 
child labour is another possibility: does respecting the principle of ‘effective abolition of 
child labour’ require member states to eliminate the use of children in pornography? 
Without Convention 182 it would be difficult to argue that the obligation on states is to 
eliminate such practices, but if the principle is to be read in light of the fundamental 
conventions (including Convention 182), then it does.
Indeed this problem had arisen before the Declaration was adopted, with some member 
states openly accepting the fundamental rights contained in the seven conventions, but 
refusing to ratify the conventions themselves on the grounds that the conventions 
themselves go beyond the scope of the fundamental rights.120 These same governments 
may now find themselves bound to respect rights in the seven conventions which they do 
not and never have regarded as fundamental. Again, the consensus on which the
120 OECD Report, p. 35.
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Declaration is built is weakened.
c. The use o f  the constitutive documents to extend obligations
f
Assuming that the choice of fundamental rights is well founded and not undermined by 
the textual link to the conventions, the way in which the obligation to respect the relevant 
conventions is extended to non-ratifying member states is itself, a first glance, 
breathtaking. The use of ‘general principles’ from a constitutive document to ground not 
only a treaty obligation, but also a supervisory mechanism appears suspect. If it were that 
easy and desirable, why had it not been done before?
In part, it had been done before. The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association referred 
to earlier was established in 1950 to deal with complaints of failure to observe the 
freedom of association conventions (Nos. 87 and 98). Under this machinery complaints 
can be made not only against member states that have ratified these two conventions, 
but also against those that have not. The basis for this extension of jurisdiction was that 
‘because the ILO Constitution lays down the principle of freedom of association, this 
principle should be observed by all member states by virtue of their membership of the 
Organization alone*.121 However radical this innovation was viewed in the 1950s, it is 
today an accepted part of the ILO supervisory machinery.
The question is whether this manoeuvre can be repeated in respect of the four rights 
outlined in the Declaration. It is difficult to argue that the right to freedom of association 
cannot be so extended. It is explicitly referred to in both the Constitution (Preamble) and 
the Declaration of Philadelphia (Article 1(b)), and has been accepted by member states 
through the Committee on Freedom of Association procedure outlined above. Likewise, 
the right to collectively bargain is explicitly mentioned in the Declaration Philadelphia 
(Article 111(e)), as is the principle of non-discrimination (Article 11(a)).122
121 Valticos & von Potobsky, p. 295.
122 ‘All human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their 
material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of
3 5
1M
T-
v However, neither forced labour northeabolition of child_ labour are specifically addressed 
, in either of the constitutive documents. A concern over forced labour might be implied 
I ; from the reference to ‘the right to pursue ... material well-being ... in conditions of 
j ! freedom and dignity ',* 123 as might a proscription on child labour from a wide reading of 
j ' the reference to ‘the protection of children [and] young persons’.124 125But such a liberal
I : reading of the entire constitutive documents would find many more fundamental rightsi j
! j than the four contained in the Declaration. Indeed the ELO itself has previously noted the 
' j difficulty with forced labour:
Clearly, the possibility of instituting a procedure like that for freedom of 
association in this field runs into difficulties, as neither the Constitution nor the
125Declaration of Philadelphia specifically refers to forced labour.
Similarly, a proscription on child labour has only very recently been acknowledged as a 
fundamental right within the ILO sphere. Even in the November 1996 the Governing 
Body was categorically stating the three fundamental labour rights as being freedom of 
association, non-discrimination and forced labour.126 At best, child labour was seen as 
deriving from a prohibition on forced labour,127 though it is doubtful that this would be 
enough to justify its ‘fundamentalness’ according to the criteria of the Declaration.
It is in respect of forced and child labour, then, that the Declaration relies most heavily on 
the international consensus outlined in Section 1 above. In these areas the extension of 
convention obligations goes beyond that used to establish the Committee of Freedom of 
Association in the 1950s, making this perhaps the most novel aspect of the document. It 
also makes these areas the most vulnerable to attack as they are totally based on a 
consensus which, as we have seen in the preceding sections, is at times debatable. The 
lack of consensus on child labour has been referred to above. And even though the forced
economic security and equal opportunity;’
123 Declaration of Philadelphia Article 11(a). *
124 Preamble to the Constitution. ’
125 GB.267/LILS/5 para. 17. *
126 GB.267/LILS/5 para. 16.
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labour convention (No. 29) is one of the most widely ratified of all 1LO conventions (82% 
of states have ratified), the continuing failure of certain member states (including the 
United States) to ratify this convention on the grounds that is does not allow prisons to be 
privately run,127 28 129indicates an ongoing difference of opinion.
d. How ‘promotional’ is the Declaration?
A fourth striking feature of the text of the Declaration is a tension between language 
which suggests something momentous and far-reaching is being established and other 
references which suggest that the Declaration is merely stating what is already the case 
and, as an instrument, may well soon become irrelevant.
The very use of an instrument called a ‘Declaration’ conveys a sense of seriousness to the 
matters being discussed which is beyond the routine. This is more so the case in the 
context of the ILO where the use of declarations is extremely rare. In its background 
paper which accompanied the draft declaration proposed to the Conference, the ILO 
Secretariat pointed out that ‘in the general practice of the organisations of the United 
Nations system, a declaration may be defined as a "formal and solemn instrument suitable 
for rare occasions when principles of lasting importance are being enunciated"’. ' 
Together with this solemnity, the wording of the Declaration conveys the idea that a 
solution is being sought for an acute and significant problem. Hence the preambular 
paragraphs of the Declaration note that:
the ILO should, now more than ever, draw upon all its standard-setting, . 
technical co-operation and research resources in all its areas of competence 
... to ensure that, in the context o f a global strategy for economic and social
127 GB.264/6 para. 2.
128 See the Report o f the Committee o f Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (ILO: Geneva, 1999) pp. 108-110 and the discussion of this report in the 
Committee on the Application of Standards, ILC 1999.
129 Other than the Declaration of Philadelphia, the only other ILO ‘declarations’ have been the 
1977 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy, and the 1964 Declaration concerning action against Apartheid in South Africa.
no offjce Background Paper, p. 16.
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development, economic and social policies are mutually reinforcing 
components in order to create broad-based sustainable development.
Further, that:
.. it is urgent, in a situation of growing economic interdependence, to 
reaffirm the immutable nature of the fundamental principles and rights 
embodied in the Constitution of the Organization and to promote their 
universal application.
This image of a problem confronting the Organization and the urgent search for a solution 
is supported by the background to the adoption of the Declaration: the growing concern 
over labour standards in both industrialised and non-industrialised countries, the social 
clause debate, the general recalcitrance of the WTO in failing to address labour issues and 
that Organization’s stated view that a solution to the trade liberalisation-labour standards 
debate must rest with the ILO.131 The ILO was being forced to respond to a challenge and 
the Declaration is its principal response.
This situation is to be contrasted with the view of the Office, many member states and 
employers representatives, that the Declaration does not by itself establish any rights as 
fundamental,132 does not of itself extend the observance of conventions to non-ratifying 
states,133 does not of impose any new obligations on member states or the other tripartite 
constituents, nor establish any new supervisory procedures or obligations.134 135Indeed it is 
the view of the ILO’s Legal Advisor that should the Declaration ultimately fulfil its 
purpose, there will be universal ratification of the seven fundamental conventions, and 
hence no need for either extending convention obligations to non-ratifying states or for 
the annual reporting of non-ratifying states under the follow-up mechanism. The
131 WTO, Ministerial Declaration 13 December 1996, note 91 above. ' 1
132 Office Background Paper, p, 10. See statements by employer (Mr Potter) and government 
(Mr. Joublanc) representatives during the plenary discussion. Declaration Committee: 
Submission, discussion and adoption.
133 Ibid., p. 18.
134 Ibid., p. 22. See also the statement of Amb. M. Moher, Chairman of the Committee on the 
Declaration of Principles: ‘No new legal commitments or obligations are incurred through, or by 
approval of, the Declaration and its follow-up’. Ibid., p. 1.
135 Interview with Francis Maupain, ILO Legal Advisor, Geneva, 30 November 1998.

Declaration’s success will render it otiose.
' /  L
The cornerstone of this rhetoric is the notion that the Declaration is promotional in 
character. As we saw in Part B this promotionality arose from an insistence on the part of 
certain government and employer members that the Declaration place no new obligations 
(including no new supervisory mechanisms) on member states. This is partly based on a 
fear that a non-pro motional Declaration could later be used in an attempt to link labour 
standards with trade based sanctions. This notion of a promotional instrument deserves 
closer examination.
The idea of promotionality is not new within the ILO system. The term has hitherto been 
used in two areas of ILO activity, which it can said are combined in the Declaration. The 
first is the category of ‘promotional’ conventions.136 37 While the greater part of ILO . 
conventions deal with rights that can apply directly to individuals in member states (such 
as those dealing with allowances or time off), others are more programmatic in nature 
and call for ratifying states to work towards certain goals, often by means of longer term 
programmes of action. The clearest example of such a promotional convention is the 
Employment Policy Convention (No. 122), which places the following obligation on 
ratifying member states:
With a view to stimulating economic growth and development, raising levels of 
living, meeting manpower requirements and overcoming unemployment and 
underemployment, each Member shall declare and pursue, as a major goal, an 
active policy designed to promote full, productive and freely chosen 
employment.138
Other examples of promotional conventions include those on social security139 and 
discrimination.140 The rationale behind this form of regulation is that it combines both the 
consensus approach to standard setting that the ILO has championed since its foundation,
136 See t.a.n 68.
137 For a more detailed discussion see Valticos & von Potobsky, p. 61.
138 Article 1(1).
139 Conventions 44, 102, 118, 128, 130 and 157
140 Conventions 100, 111 and 156.
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with a level of flexibility for member states at differing levels of development. This, 
however, is also the principal criticism of promotional conventions: they try to regulate 
areas so abstract that it becomes at times impossible for member states to know how to 
comply with the convention and for the supervisory machinery to evaluate a state’s 
compliance.141
The second manifestation of promotionality in the ILO system is in the field of technical 
assistance. Designed to support the Organisations system of international labour 
standards, a portion of the ILO’s technical assistance programme is devoted to 
‘promoting’ compliance with ILO conventions. These activities include seminars for 
legislators and the judiciary, advice on how to bring national legislation into conformity 
with convention obligations, and the publication of handbook and manual of giving effect 
to convention obligations in the workplace.142
These two dimensions of promotionality are synthesised in the Declaration. Rather than
seeking an undertaking to implement enforceable rights, the Declaration merely 
‘encourages the efforts of member states ... to promote ... fundamental principles’,143 
while at the same time placing an obligation on the ILO ‘to assist its Members, in 
response to their established and expressed needs, in order to attain these objectives by 
making full use of its constitutional, operational and budgetary resources’.144 The one 
large difference, however, is that even promotional ILO conventions are subject to a 
critical and comparative supervisory machinery, whereas the Declaration attempts to 
create a follow-up mechanism which is itself ‘promotional’. The inherent contradictions 
in this scheme will be examined below.
It has been suggested that insistence on a promotional follow-up mechanism has given a
141 See Defending Values, p. 47-49,
142 See Galenson, p. 151 ; Valticos & Potobsky, p. 303.
143 Article 1.1.
144 Article 3.
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political rather than judicial flavour to the procedure.145 Had the follow-up more closely 
followed established ILO supervisory mechanisms, compliance would have been secured 
through respect for the decision of an independent body after an adversarial presentation 
and response to a given factual situation. As drafted however, the Declaration’s follow-up 
mechanism will rely on political pressure be brought to bear among the tripartite 
constituents in the Governing Body and the ILC: the publicising of ‘poor compliance 
records of laggard member governments in the hope that public embarrassment will 
encourage change.’146 But while it is tme that the prospects for coercive change under the 
Declaration’s follow-up mechanism are slight,147 it is difficult to see the established ILO 
reporting procedures as relying any less on political pressure and embarrassment. 
Although the Committee o f Experts’ reports are comprehensive in scope, the possibility 
for real sanction is marginal. Beyond issuing a ‘request’ for more information, an 
‘observation’ on a member state’s compliance or a table showing which members are 
tardy in submission of reports, there is little that can be done.148.- Under the second 
established reporting procedure, the Conference Committee on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, the Committee ‘selects’ cases before the 
Committee of Experts, invites further responses from the governments involved, then 
presents a report to the ILC. Again, recalcitrance on the part of governments risks only 
mild reproach in the ILC. This is not to say that these two procedures have had little 
effect. Rather, as part of the consensual ILO approach, these procedures rely heavily 
(almost totally) on the political pressure arising from the public airing of domestic 
situations among fellow member states, be they policy failures or specific instances.
Whether the Declaration merely reaffirms the status quo or whether it will effect a change
145 E. McKeon, Worker Rights in the Global Economy, p. 59.
146 Ibid. Note that during the drafting of the Declaration, the employer group pushed for a 
mechanism in which reports submitted by member states would be filtered by the Office so that 
only cases of persistent policy failure would reach a discussion in the Governing Body while 
individual and isolated cases would be filtered out: Minutes of 271st Session of the Governing 
Body Geneva, March 1998.
147 Though see the arguments below for the way in which the scope of the follow-up might be 
amplified in practice.
148 See L. Betten, International Labour Law: selected issues, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1993), p. 397.
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in the ILO’s relations with its constituents by establishing new obligations will only 
become apparent once its procedures are operational. There are, however, indications in 
the follow-up procedure that suggest that it will be difficult to maintain the Declaration as 
merely a promotional instrument.
Much could be postulated on the potential effect of the two follow-up procedures and
how they will effect the established ILO supervisory mechanisms. The drafters of the1 . -/■
/  ~
Declaration are at pains to point out that the follow-up procedures are promotional, and 
that there is no threat of punitive action against a member state based on these 
mechanisms. Rather, the results of each reporting procedure are to be used by the ILO to: ì
1
identify areas in which the assistance of the Organization through its 
technical co-operation activities may prove useful to its Members to help 
them implement these fundamental principles and rights.149
Three areas seem, however, to allow these procedures to be used in a confrontational 
rather than promotional manner.
i. Information sources
The first is the information on which the Global Report is to be based. The Global Report 
is to be drawn up by the Office primarily using the contents of the Annual Reports and 
periodic reports submitted to the Committee of Experts. However, the Office may also 
use ‘information gathered and assessed in accordance with established procedures’.150 On 
current ILO practice this would not only allow the use of information provided in the
i
form of reports of other international organisations, but also perhaps the use of; 
information provided by non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
' i *
NGO involvement in ILO activities has increased markedly over the past five years. A 
long-time barrier to increased NGO participation in the ILO has been the fear of tripartite
149 Annex Article 1.2.
150 Annex Article III.B{1).
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constituents (especially worker representatives) that their role in the ILO would be 
usurped by other civil society actors. Despite this, many ILO procedures are ‘porous’ to 
the receipt of NGO information, an example being the recent debates on the new child 
labour convention.151 These channels are being formalised, in particular through the  ^
loosening of restrictions on NGOs being given observer status at Governing Body a n d . 
Conference meetings.152 153Judging by commitments made by the former Director General, 
this process seems sure to continue and accelerate. ‘ It is thus not unlikely that the 
consideration of country specific NGO-provided information will form part of the follow­
up process. Although the reporting procedures involve no punitive measures, many 
governments nonetheless might fail see a requirement to defend themselves against 
allegations of international (or even domestic) NGOs in an international forum as 
‘promotional’.
This possibility did not escape unnoticed during the plenary debates on the Declaration. 
Responding to a question posed by the Government member of Pakistan, the ILO Legal 
Advisor ‘confirmed categorically that information provided by NGOs could not be 
considered as official or as information gathered and assessed in accordance with the 
procedures referred to under [the follow-up mechanism]’.154 This was because ‘the term 
“established procedures” was a general reference to procedures providing guarantees of 
“due process” which, in addition to Articles 19 and 22, concerned Articles 24 and 26 of 
the Constitution’.155 Solely on the basis of this exchange, the Governing Body 
subsequently declared that:
The term “official information” refers to information that is considered as such at 
the national level, such as official gazettes. Information “gathered and assessed in 
accordance with established procedures” comprises in general information 
deriving from procedures that afford guarantees o f due process, within both the 
ILO and other intergovernmental organisations, on the understanding that
151 Interview with Katherine Hagen, ILO Deputy Director General, 3 December 1998.
152 ibid.
153 1997 Report of the ILO Director-General: The ILO, standard setting and globalization 
(Geneva, 1997), p. 21.
154 Record of proceedings, 1998ILC para. 157.
155 Ibid. para. 148.
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information from non-governmental organisations is not as such covered by this 
concept.156
The question is whether these statements are sufficient to exclude NGO-based 
information from the process. Three points might be made. First, even if the Governing 
Body position set out above is adhered to, the procedure will still be porous to the 
reception of NGO information. Despite their general antipathy towards NGO 
involvement, the most obvious conduit is the worker group. An NGO seeking to present 
its information to the Director General for inclusion in the Global Report need only find a 
sympathetic union through which the information can be presented. This manoeuvre has 
been previously used to great effect in the ILO context.157 Similarly, much of the 
information gathered from tripartite constituents, other international organisations and 
even from within the ILO itself will have a significant NGO-based content.158 The ILO 
itself ‘may make suitable arrangements for such consultation as it may think desirable 
with recognised non-governmental international organizations’,159 consultation which 
again allows the input of NGO information. Presumably such ‘suitable arrangements’ 
somehow afford a ‘guarantee of due process’. Third, the position of the ILO Legal 
Advisor and Governing Body are not necessarily definitive, and use of the phrase ‘on the 
understanding’ in the Governing Body decision set out above leaves scope for future 
expansion of the use of NGO information. It must be admitted that the current balance.of 
opinion in both the Governing Body and the Conference would resist such an expansion. 
However the real power in this area lies with the Director General, not only because of
156 GB.274/2 para. 37. Emphasis added.
157 An striking example is that of the Huichol people’s denunciation of Mexico under the ILO 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (Convention No. 169). In keeping with the ILO’s 
strict tripartism, the complaints mechanism under this convention permits only complaints ‘from 
an industrial association of employers or workers’ (Article 2.2 of the Governing Body Standing 
Orders). The Huichol people’s complaint was thus rejected for lack of standing. The tribe then 
approached the local branch of the Mexican National Union of Education Workers (SNTE), 
which though not directly concerned with indigenous issues, was willing to show solidarity with 
the Huichol indigenous communities in their claim. The formal complaint made by the SNTE 
was declared receivable by the Governing Body and a tripartite committee of the inquiry was 
appointed (GB.270/205 para. 61). Much of the information in this footnote was provide by Luis 
Rodríguez-Pinero Royo.
158 One need only look at the reports produced by UNICEF (State of the World’s Child, MONEE
Report) and UNDP (Human Development Report).
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the generally inordinate power of the Office within the ILO,* 160 but because of his 
particular power in relation to the Global Reports, which are to be ‘drawn up under the 
responsibility o f the Director General’ .161 162A Director General well-disposed towards the 
use of NGO information could, at the very least, exploit the porous features of the system 
outlined above.
In this regard it is important to note the changing attitude of the Office towards non- 
tripartite civil society. The failure of the Organisation to embrace civil society actors has 
long been criticised. ‘ While tripartite members, especially workers, are still resistant to 
change in this respect, the Office has progressively instituted measures designed to 
facilitate the input of NGOs. Starting with the recognition of the need to open up to civil 
society,163 the Office has steadily built up stronger relations with NGOs, and increased 
the total number of NGOs with whom it has formalised relations to 155.164 It is true that 
most NGO activity within the ILO occurs in the field technical assistance, however 
current initiatives in the labour standards area are building on previous instances of 
engagement with civil society, for example the role of NGO information in 
Commissions of Inquiry.165
If, as it appears, the new Director General continues this trend,166 then it is reasonable to
l5g ILO Constitution Article 12(3).
160 See Galenson, p. 98 and following.
161 Article B.l.
162 Leary, The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights’, p. 37. Cf Abdul-Karim Tikriti, 
Tripartism and the International Labour Organisation, (Stockholm: SIFIR, 1982) p. 346-348. It 
is not all the ILO’s fault: ‘most NGOs have failed to develop strategies to work within the ILO’: 
Leary, ‘The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights’, p. 25.
163 See Defending Values at pp. 63-66: “... tripartism, the ILO’s most original feature and the 
source of its strength, constitutes both a limitation and a new opportunity”.
164 These non-tripartite NGOs appear on the so-called Special List, see: 
http://www.ilo.Org/pub1ic/english/civi1/relngios.htm#asln
165 See, for example, the fourteen ‘Communications from non-governmental organizations’ 
considered by the Commission of Inquiry into Forced Labour in Myanmar: Concluding 
Observations of the recent Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 o f the 
Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of
the Forced Labour Convention of 2 July 1998, p. 4,
166 In Decent Work, his first Report to the ILC, Mr Somavia addressed ‘the rise of civil society’,
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expect a large amount of pressure to build over the coming years for NGO information to 
be included in the Global Reports.
ii. The Group of Experts
A second area in which the promotional nature of the reporting procedures is vulnerable 
relates to the use of a ‘group of experts’ to provide ‘an introduction to [Annual Reports]
I
..., drawing attention to any aspects which might call for a more in-depth discussion’. 
The size and composition of this group was decided by the Governing Body meeting in 
March 1999. It was decided, inter alia , that the group would consist of seven eminent 
persons who among them have ‘the expertise necessary for a correct understanding of the 
different situations it is called upon to examine, in terms of both from the 
interdisciplinary nature of the exercise and the diversity of socio-economic 
circumstances’ .168 Again, there seems to be scope for a critical appraisal by this Group of 
a member state’s performance under one of the fundamental conventions. This is even 
more likely considering the independence of the experts, who would no doubt feel more 
at liberty to criticise a government than, for example, the Director General or a tripartite 
committee. Indeed their mandate to ‘draw attention to aspects that seem to call for more 
in-depth discussion’ would seem to facilitate a critical rather than promotional role. This 
role would be further supported by Article 4 of the Declaration which calls for a follow­
up which is ‘meaningful and effective’.
Much thus depends on the way in which the role and procedures of the Group of Experts 
are developed over the coming months. It is surprising that these issues were not laid 
down with greater specificity in the Declaration, which merely provides:
and although his conclusions were largely non-committal (‘closer links with civil society, if well 
defined, can be a source of great strength for the ILO and its constituents’: p. 43), this might be 
seen in light of a new Director General’s caution in needing to secure the support of the tripartite 
constituents (especially the workers) for his larger reform programme.
167
168
Annex Article II.B(3). 
GB.274/2 para. 20.
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With a view to presenting an introduction to the reports thus compiled, drawing 
attention to any aspects which might call for a more in-depth discussion, the 
Office may call upon a group of experts appointed for this purpose by the 
Governing Body.169
The manner in which the Group of Experts is operationalised by the Governing Body (as 
always, acting on Office proposals) will have a bearing not only the operation of the 
Declaration as a whole but also on the integrity of other ILO supervisory mechanisms, in 
particular the Committee of Experts. Concerned as it is with scrutinising ratifying states 
compliance with their obligations under ILO conventions, the Committee of Experts not 
unreasonably fears that a Group of Experts that strays beyond a promotional role will 
undermine its own role. It is not only the spectre of conflicting pronouncements from the 
two groups on the same factual situation that concerns the Committee of Experts, but also 
the wider challenge to the Committee of Experts* pre-eminence in the ILO system since 
1927 i70 mere existence of another independent body within the ILO with a 
responsibility for the application of labour standards would necessarily lower both the 
weight of the Committee of Experts’ observations (including the persuasiveness of its 
jurisprudence in other spheres) and its ability to shape ILO policy. It is supportive of the 
argument made above (that is, that the Group of Experts has the scope to move beyond it 
promotional mandate) that the Committee of Experts felt sufficiently concerned to raise 
the matter in their 1999 annual report to the ILC:
The Committee notes that the follow-up mechanism is not intended to be a 
substitute for the established supervisory mechanisms nor will it impede their 
functioning. The Committee notes the need for care to be exercised in this regard 
and further that action is required to ensure that a consistent and coherent 
approach with the ILO’s established standards and supervisory mechanisms is 
maintained in practice.171
The first part of this warning by the Committee echoes the wording of Article 1.2. of the 
Declaration:
Annex Article II.B.3.
170 See Valticos & von Potobsky, pp. 284 onwards; Landy, The Effectiveness o f International 
Supervision, pp. 19-31.
171 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(ILO: Geneva, 1999) para. 59. Emphasis added.
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[The follow-up mechanism] is not a substitute for the established supervisory 
mechanisms, nor shall it impede their functioning; consequently, specific 
situations within the purview o f those mechanisms shall not be examined or re­
examined within the framework of this follow-up.
However their view that 'action is required’ suggests that the existence of this provision 
is enough and that the Committee’s fears will be realised under the present arrangements.
So are the Committee of Experts fears well founded? It has been argued above that there 
is certainly scope for the Group of Experts to assume a supervisory role. Three further 
issues seem to suggest the worst for the Committee.
The first is striking similarity of both the profile of the each body and the procedure for 
their respective appointments. Each set of experts is appointed for three years, “ must be 
“ impartial’ and ‘independent’ ,17'1 and must ensure a balance of experience with different 
legal and social systems.172 374 175Most importantly, the experts of each body are appointed by 
a resolution of the Governing Body on the proposal of the Director General. This 
feature will be discussed in more detail below. Further, in considering the Annual Reports 
of member states, the Group o f Experts will be obliged to take into account the comments 
on the reports made by domestic tripartite groups, a task also borne by the Committee of 
Experts in considering periodic reports.176 These similarities are simply being noted to 
suggest that when operational, the Group of Experts will appear very much like the 
Committee of Experts.177 Were the Group of Experts to be motivated to function in a way 
similar to the Committee of Experts, then these similarities would assist by making it 
easier for the Group of Experts to adopt the functional and procedural features of the
172 All requirements for members of the Committee of Experts are restated in the Committee’s 
Report to the 73rd Session of the ILC (1987), Report III (Part 4 A) para. 18; GB.274/2 para.21.
173 GB.274/2 para. 16.
174 GB.274/2 para. 20.
175 GB,274/205 para. 4, and GB.274/2 para. 19.
176 Both pursuant to Article 23 ILO Constitution: GB.274/205 para. 3.
177 This similarity was not lost on the Office or Governing Body. As the job description they had 
drafted made members of the Committee of Experts the most qualified to join the Group of 
Experts, it was also decided that ‘members of the group [of Experts] ... should not have any
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Committee of Experts. This would not be coincidental as the Annual Reporting system in 
which the Group of Experts is to function is based on the Article 19 reporting system for 
unratified conventions, the latter being within the terms of reference of the Committee of 
Experts.* 178
One difference between the two bodies merely strengthens the case that the Group of 
Expert will evolve into a supervisory rather than promotional body. There is no limit on 
the number of members of the Committee of Experts. After an initial period they have 
generally numbered twenty but at the time of writing there are nineteen.179 However, on 
the advice of the Office, the Governing Body has specified that the Group of Experts is to 
be limited to an uneven number of members, initially seven. No reason is given:
As regards the composition of the group of experts, several considerations will 
have to be taken into account: first, there should be an uneven number of 
experts.180
Presumably this condition is to facilitate a majority decision if a vote is called on any 
matter. This may appear to be an inconsequential point, however it is difficult to see 
why a small group whose only task is to write an short introduction to a country’s Annual 
Report which draws attention ‘to any aspects which might call for a more in-depth 
discussion’ would need to call a vote on an issue. Perhaps there might be disagreement 
among the experts as to which aspects should recommend to the Governing Body for 
more in-depth discussion. But the Governing Body is entitled to discuss anything arising 
in an Annual Report, whether the Experts draw attention to it or not, hence there is no 
question of a Group of Experts wielding any power to restrict the information available to 
the Governing Body. The condition would, however, support the functioning of a body 
that was to deal with contentious matters, such as the highlighting of areas in an Annual 
Report in a critical or comparative way.
other function within the ILO or its various bodies.’: GB.274/2 para. 18.
178 Committee of Experts Report to the 73rd Session of the ILC (1987), Report III (Part 4A) para. 
17.
179 E. Landy, The Effectiveness o f International Supervision, p. 21.
180 GB.274/2 para. 20.
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The second issue that will have a large bearing on the role of the Group of Experts is the 
involvement of the Director General and Office in the selection procedure. Elsewhere we 
have mentioned the large (perhaps inordinately so) role the Director General and Office 
play a in shaping policy within the Organisation, and the Declaration appears to be no 
exception. In relation to the Group of Experts, all of the requirements and procedures 
referred to above and below which were left to be decided after the adoption of the 
Declaration have been suggested in the first instance by the Office.181 182 Hence, at the 
March 1999 session of the Governing Body, every proposal of the Office regarding the 
Declaration was adopted by the Governing Body, the only amendment being a minor 
adjustment to the forms to be used in requesting Annual Reports from states. The 
functioning of the Declaration’s follow up procedure (including the Group of Experts) 
cannot be said to be immune from the concerns and aspirations of the Office. Similarly, 
the Director General plays a pivotal role in the selection of the Group of Experts. In an 
example of an Office control mechanism being inserted after an executive decision has 
been made by member states, the Declaration allowed for the Group of Experts to be 
‘appointed . . by  the Governing Body’ .183 The Office then successfully proposed that the 
selection be made by the Governing Body from a shortlist chosen by the Director 
General.184 Although it might be said that any other method (for example the calling of 
nominations from the tripartite constituents) would undermine the impartiality of the 
Experts, the chosen procedure places a significant -  some might say enormous -  amount 
of influence over the composition of the Group of Experts (and thus over the functioning 
of the follow-up) in the hands o f the Director General. Once appointed, the 
‘independence’ of the experts would leave the Director General free of any responsibility 
for their actions.185
181 ‘As regards all other aspects involved in implementing the follow-up, the Governing Body has 
requested the Office to submit concrete proposals at its 274th Session.’: GB.274/2 para. 2.
182 GB.274/2 paras 15, 23, 31 and 34; GB.274/205 paras 2-6.
183 Annex Article II.B.3.
184 GB.274/205 para. 4.
185 The domestic analogy of political appointments by the executive to judicial positions seems 
apposite.
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The third factor is the terms of reference of the Group of Experts* As mentioned above, 
the Declaration gives the Group a mandate to examine the each Annual Report and draft 
‘an introduction to the reports thus compiled, drawing attention to any aspects which 
might call for a more in-depth discussion’. This appears to have been amplified by the 
Governing Body such that:
The purpose of this introduction is to facilitate the Governing Body's discussions 
by analysing the replies received, in particular as regards the assessment o f the 
factual situation and the progress made, so as to draw attention to any aspects thatI ftAmight call for more in-depth discussion.
It is expected that after the first round of Annual Reporting, states will merely be asked to 
provide any changes to the their law and practice in respect of the fundamental rights.186 87 
The reporting forms for the first round of Annual Reports as adopted by the Governing 
Body are designed to collect reference data from any changes are measured.188
It thus appears that the Group of Experts will not be able to fulfil their role without 
passing some judgement on a state’s action or inaction over the previous twelve months. 
One finds it difficult to imagine how else their ‘introduction’ could be drafted, nor can 
one imagine that the points to which they will drawn the Governing Body’s attention will 
be the routine or non-contentious issues.189 The Office seems to think the investigation 
will go even further. A senior Office member has described the role of the Declaration in 
the following terms:
[The Declaration] should stimulate more countries to ratify ILO’s basic standards, 
by subjecting their motives to sustained scrutiny until they do, while allowing in- 
depth examination o f situations arising when they have not ratified.190
186 GB.274/2 para. 24. Italics added.
187 GB.274/2 para. 11.
188 See GB.274/2 (Add.l).
189 One might foresee the Experts ‘congratulating’ or ‘encouraging’ a member state on positive 
changes since their last reports, but it seems unlikely that these would need to be referred to the 
Governing Body for more ‘in-depth’ praise.
190 Swepston, ILM. Emphasis added.
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The independence of the Group from the Office and the tripartite constituents should only 
encourage them to adopt a critical perspective on the Annual Reports*
iii* Discussion of the Reports
Finally, in considering the promotionality of the follow-up procedure, there is the 
question of the fora in which both the Annual and Global Reports are to be discussed: the 
Governing Body for the Annual Report and the Conference for the Global Report. 
Governments may expect that in both these fora - half of members of which are
representatives of fellow member states - a report on their compliance with the
fundamental principles will not be the subject of criticism or comparison. Solidarity 
between member states might suggest at least this. However the scope for the
embarrassment of having a negative report merely discussed in these fora could be
sufficient to put governments on the defensive.
The terms of reference laid down by the Declaration for discussion of both the Annual 
and Global Reports are scant. Annual Reports ‘will be reviewed by the Governing 
Body’ .191 192Global Reports ‘will be submitted to the Conference for tripartite discussion as 
a report of the Director-General’, after which it is for the Governing Body ‘to draw 
conclusions from this discussion concerning the priorities and plans of action for 
technical co-operation to be implemented for the following four-year period’. These 
mandates are to be read in light of the general injunction that:
this follow-up will allow the identification of areas in which the assistance of the 
Organization through its technical co-operation activities may prove useful to its 
Members to help them implement these fundamental principles and rights.191
If we first focus on the Annual Reports, a deeper examination of the Declaration and 
events since its adoption alter this plan of a non-combative discussion in the Governing 
Body in which member states’ Annual Reports are merely used to define areas ripe for
191 Article 2.B.2.
192 Article 3.B.2
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technical assistance. First, the Declaration allows for the standing orders of the Governing 
Body (where not all governments are represented) to be amended to allow member states 
whose reports are being discussed ‘to provide, in the most appropriate way, clarifications 
which might prove necessary or useful during Governing Body discussions to supplement 
the information contained in their reports’. A right of reply to both the Group of Experts’ 
‘introduction’ and any matters that arise during the Governing Body discussion is thus 
established.* 194 Once the discussion of an Annual Report allows the member state 
concerned to reply to assertions of both the Group of Experts and members of the 
Governing Body, it is difficult to imagine a procedural mechanism that would prevent an 
adversarial debate developing.195 Being only too aware of this evolution into an quasi- 
adversarial procedure, the Office and Governing Body have attempted to impose such a 
mechanism. In proposing the changes to the Standing Orders to give effect to this right of 
reply, the Office noted that:
Under the Constitution and Standing Orders currently in force, the participation of 
States that are not members of the Governing Body is strictly limited to 
adversarial procedures. In order to accommodate the promotional participation 
called for by the Conference as part of follow-up [sic] on the Declaration, and so 
as not to create any precedent and to avoid any confusion with the adversarial 
procedures, the Office has prepared a solution that involves enabling the 
Governing Body to suspend its official sittings and to meet as a committee of the 
whole.
The Governing Body may decide to meet as a committee of the whole in order to 
hold an informal exchange of views, in which it may decide to give, according to 
modalities to be determined by it, an opportunity to representatives whose 
governments are not represented on the Governing Body to take the floor or to 
submit a communication in writing.196
Whether or not this manoeuvre on the part of the Governing Body will be successful will
Article 1.2.
194 GB.274/2 para. 25.
195 It should also be noted that the member state’s representatives will also be replying for the 
first time to the comments on its Annua! Report by both domestic worker and employer groups.
196 GB.274/2 paras 26 and 29.
5 3
LF F I
only become clear with practice.197 The point for present purposes is to illustrate the 
difficulty in integrating the notion of promotionality into ILO’s supervisory system, and, 
consequently, how swiftly the promotional aims of the Declaration might degenerate (or 
perhaps regenerate) into a new supervisory procedure.
If we turn to the Global Report, the scope for a critical discussion of the individual 
member states behaviour is less likely owing to the fact that the position in all member 
states is discussed within a single report. The Declaration calls for the Global Report to 
be ‘submitted to the Conference for tripartite discussion as a report of the Director- 
General’ .198 The Governing Body has decided that the discussion will take place in a 
separate session of the ILC plenary rather than in a committee of restricted membership 
as was originally proposed.199 Although criticism of individual states is rare within the 
Conference, it is not unknown. In one way, the location of the discussion of Global 
Reports in the conference plenary may actually facilitate a debate with individual member 
states as, ‘since all member states (with a few minor exceptions) send delegations to the 
Conference, it is difficult for them to refuse to provide a representative to respond to 
questions’ .200 The results of the Conference discussion of the Global Report will 
themselves be subject to further discussion in the subsequent Governing Body session.201
The purpose of suggesting these ways in which the promotional character of the 
Declaration could be undermined is to show that the Declaration has the capacity to go 
beyond the intention of its proponents and grow in importance in the ILO rather than 
ultimately wane. Its potential to be used as a ‘stick’ against member states who do not put 
into practice the rhetoric of fundamental rights, and its potential to be used as a basis
197 As with all arrangements for the implementation of the follow-up mechanism, this decision of 
the Governing Body will be subject to review by the Conference. Article IV. 2 of the Declaration 
provides that:
The Conference shall, in due course, review the operation of this follow-up in the light of 
the experience acquired to assess whether it has adequately fulfilled the overall purpose 
articulated in Part I.
198 Annex Article III.B.2.
199 GB.274/2 para. 38.
200 V. Leary, ‘Lessons from the experience of the International Labour Organisation’, p. 601.
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from which to claim new fundamental rights, are clearly seems at odds with its 
promotional nature. The issues discussed above suggest that the three and a half page 
Declaration and follow-up will have a greater impact on both the ILO and its constituents 
than its drafters and promoters intended.
4. What does the adoption of the Declaration mean for the ILO system of
international labour standards?
Much has been postulated above about the possible effects o f the Declaration once it is 
operational. In particular, the analysis has focused on the supposed ‘promotional’ nature 
of the instrument and suggested ways in which this could be undermined. As such it is 
largely conjecture, albeit deduced in light of past experiences of the ILO, such as the 
powerful role of the Office and the Director General. Little will be clear until the 
provisions of the Declaration and its follow-up are operational, and even later, after these 
provisions have been interpreted by a period of practice. With this caveat, we turn to 
look at the possible effects of the Declaration on the ILO’s system of international labour 
standards. At the outset of this thesis it was suggested that the challenges faced by this 
system demanded either reform of the system itself, or a movement ‘beyond standards’. 
The issue now is whether the Declaration can be seen as a modification of the standards 
system in order to address some of the system’s more glaring inadequacies in dealing 
with the effects of trade liberalisation, or whether its manifold novelties take it outside the 
standards system entirely.
It would be disingenuous to argue that the Declaration is not an international labour 
standard of some sort. It clearly promotes the observance o f (and arguably creates) norms 
applying across different jurisdictions. Our comparison, however, is with the ILO system 
of international labour standards, and all of the features that entails as outlined in Part II 
above. On this basis, it is relevant to note that the Declaration was negotiated on a
201 GB.274/2 paras 40-46.
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consensus basis, it involved all tripartite constituents, and it benefits from a high level of 
technical assistance from the Office. But even with these features the Declaration does 
not sit happily within the international labour code. The novelty of declarations within the 
ILO system, the problems with confused definition of fundamental rights, the lack, of^a 
clear link with the core conventions and the insistence on promotionality, all set the 
Declaration apart. Its advent has required the drafting of special procedures and 
amendments to standards and supervision procedures that have hitherto remained intact 
for over seventy years. One might say that the same could have been said of the 
Committee on Freedom of Association procedure when it was introduced in the 1950s. 
That development, however, promoted the features of the ILO model: it was clearly based 
in a convention, it establised a complaints base procedure, and comprises both political 
(the tripartite Committee on Freedom of Association) and technical (the independent 
Fact-finding and Conciliation Commission) aspects.
The Declaration on the other hand establishes a follow-up mechanism that displays few
of the features outlined in Part II. Promotion rather than compliance is to be monitored, 
the balance of technical and political is skewed in favour of the political as the role of the 
Group of Experts is (on its face) marginal. The instrument is mandatory in nature, in the 
sense that it is not based on member states freely accepting obligations, at least insofar as 
the follow-up is concerned. We have seen above that the ‘standards’ being set are far 
from precise and the way in which member states are to give effect to them is unclear in 
the extreme. Notions of flexibility pervades both the fundamental rights and the way in 
which states are obliged to enforce them. The follow-up expressly excludes the possibility 
of a complaints-based system.
The formal view of the ILO on the relationship between the Declaration and the 
international labour standards is somewhat confused. On the one hand, it has been 
emphasised that the Declaration is part of a programme designed to strengthen the labour 
standards system insofar as its goal is to promote universal ratification of the fundamental
5 6
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conventions.202 In this light, the Declaration might be seen to be akin to technical co­
operation, which also has as an aim assisting ratification of ILO conventions. But the 
Declaration itself and the debates surrounding its adoption are often at pains to emphasise 
that the two processes need to be distinguished: one being the ILO’s competence ‘to set 
and deal with international labour standards’, the other being the ‘organisation’s role in 
promoting fundamental rights at work as the expression of its constitutional 
principles’ .203
It is submitted that the Declaration cannot properly be considered a part of the standards 
system as developed by the ILO over the past 80 years. It is grounded in constitutional ] 
procedures and its links with ILO conventions and supervisory procedures are^j 
purposefully unclear. Its role, rather than being to enforce rights, is to promote. In this 
sense, it is sui generis. It will, as we have seen, necessarily impact on the standards 
system. Ostensibly, this impact is to be beneficial, as the stated goal of the Declaration is 
to promotes rights that ‘have been expressed and developed in the form of specific 
rights and obligations in Conventions’ .204 Our examination in the previous sections, 
however, would suggest that ultimately, the effect of the Declaration on the international 
labour code will be undermining. While much depends on the way the Declaration is 
applied in practice (and the earlier discussion argues that there is scope for a robust rights 
based supervisory procedure to develop rather than the promotional scheme envisaged), 
the Declaration appears to constitute a new approach to the international regulation of 
labour. The features of this new approach appear to be:
1. a division of labour rights into immutable or ‘fundamental’ rights on the one 
hand and other, ‘relative’ rights on the other;
202 Office Background Paper, p. 4.
203 Declaration preambular paragraph 6. Note that the original draft of this paragraph saw the 
promotion role as deriving from (and therefore being part of) the ILO’s standard setting mandate:
Whereas the ILO, under its exclusive mandate to establish and implement international 
labour standards, is universally acknowledged as the competent organization to promote 
these fundamental rights as the expression of its constitutional principles and values 
(Office Background Paper, Annex).
This wording was subsequently changed.
204 Article l.b.
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2 . an approach to implementation that downplays enforcement and emphasises 
technical assistance;
3 . a less prominent role for independent experts; and
4. the maintenance of the strong influence of the Office over the implementation
process.
If this observation is true, then the Declaration will in the future not be sui generis, but 
will be the first instrument of a new approach to labour regulation which is beyond 
standards. We now turn to look at the second option being proposed to the ILO.
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IV. CODES OF CONDUCT
If the Declaration can been seen as a response generated by the ILO to external pressure 
to ‘do something’ about the social effects of trade liberalisation, then the experience with 
private sector initiatives is quite the opposite. Again, we have the ILO doing very little in 
the area. But the other actors (multi-national enterprises (MNEs), employer groups and 
other NGOs and even some governments) are doing much, and at first glance are 
seemingly happy to have the ILO uninvolved if not excluded. Yet the exponential growth 
in the 1990s of private initiatives in the field of labour rights in some ways mirrors the 
rising challenges of trade liberalisation facing the ILO and its labour standards system. 
For many, these private initiatives have begun to fill the void left by the increasing 
ineffectiveness and even irrelevance o f the ILO’s conventions. Although the true picture 
is far more complex, private initiatives can be seen to present an alternative to the 
international labour code and, more acutely, its supervisory mechanisms. This is a 
response to trade liberalisation that has been forced on the ILO and for the reasons 
outlined below, it is an alternative that the Organization can scarcely afford to ignore for 
much longer.
1. Codes of conduct as private sector initiatives
Without definition, the term ‘private sector initiatives’ seems hopelessly wide. Even with 
the definition set out below, one might think that a more focused tag could be found to 
describe the various activities that fall within its sphere. The term however is used here 
for two reasons. First, the activities it denotes are recent in conception and expanding in 
scope. Thus, while they may have appeared two or three years ago to concern themselves 
solely with corporate social responsibility, the advent o f NGO, investor and even 
government involvement has taken them beyond the scope o f a ‘corporate initiatives’ tag. 
Likewise, the increasing mélange of social and environmental issues within the initiatives 
would belie any purely social view of the phenomenon as a whole. The second reason
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behind the use of term here is that it is the phrase used within the ILO to describe these
, . . 205activities.
Private sector initiatives are defined by their non-governmental or private sector 
character.205 06 Although governments are now seeking to influence these initiatives, that 
influence is (and, it is submitted, will remain for the foreseeable future) restricted to an 
advisory and not regulatory role.207 208Indeed it is the voluntary nature of the initiatives that 
underlines the core reason for their emergence: the increasing inability of governments to
* • * 'IQgfill the regulatory role in the area of labour issues in the era of trade liberalisation^ The 
three major private sector initiatives around today are codes of conduct, social labelling 
programmes and investor initiatives.209 We will limit our discussion to codes of conduct, 
but all three types of initiative share similar advantages and constraints.
Codes of conduct are written statements that are intended to regulate an enterprise’s
205 Overview of the global developments and Office activities concerning codes of conduct, social
labelling and other private sector initiatives addressing labour issues,
GB.273/WP/SDL/1 (Rev. 1), p. J.
206 Ibid, p. 1.
207 See, for example, the Canadian Government’s Voluntary Codes Guide
(http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ca00880e.htmI); the Australian Government’s Fair trading - codes 
of conduct : why have them, how to prepare them (Canberra : Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1996), the New Zealand Government’s Guidelines on Developing a Code o f Practice 
(Wellington, N.Z. : Ministry of Consumer Affairs, 1993) and the United States Government’s 
Model Business Principles, part of its Best Global Business Practices Program (see 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/bgp/model.html).
208 This is not to deny the existence of private sector initiatives run as voluntary partnerships 
between the private sector and governments. However a government’s role in such a partnership 
is limited to (generally technical) advice.
209 The term ‘social labelling’ has come to connote a means of communicating information 
through a physical label about the social conditions surrounding the production of a product or 
rendering of a service (GB.273/WP/SDL/l(Rev.l), para. 68). Investor initiatives broadly take 
three forms. Under the first, investment fund screening, investment portfolios invest or divest in 
publicly trade corporate securities depending on the social performance of the company. 
Shareholder initiatives on the other hand, include activities based on share ownership such as 
exercising voting rights, submitting shareholder resolutions, asking questions at corporate annual 
meetings and even informal negotiations between shareholders and management. The third form 
is known as community investing. Different in character from those outlined above, this approach 
sees investment programmes focused on community development initiatives (see 
http://www.socialinvest.org/InvSRItrends.htm).
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conduct and often that of other actors. Other than labour issues, codes of c o n d u c e  
that deal with environmental matters, corruption and even interference in the d o n u ^ te c r t^ ^  
political process. We are here concerned with codes of conduct that regulate corporate 
behaviour in labour issues at the international level: that is, codes that cover workers 
employed directly by an enterprise in a foreign jurisdiction, or (more commonly) codes 
that cover workers employed by foreign suppliers and which thus attempt to regulate 
behaviour, practices and standards of participants in supply chains.210
The motivations behind the adoption o f a code of conduct by a corporation are essentially 
commercial. The need to preserve or legitimise a reputable public image has become not 
merely a tool in increasing the market share of an enterprise’s product, but also an form 
of insurance against the rising number of consumer boycotts following exposés of 
conditions in which workers produce goods for a well-known brand name. An example at 
the time of writing of the dangers of not only failing to adopt a code but also o f not 
enforcing a code once adopted, is that of a clothing brand Kathy Lee Gifford. The brand, 
which is sponsored by the US television personality of the same name, is retailed by 
WalMart Inc. (the world’s largest retailer), where it sold over $300 million worth of stock 
in its first year. In April 1996 a US-based NGO exposed the conditions of workers 
making garments for the line in a Honduras clothing factory: extensive use of child 
labour, wages of 31 cents per hour, seventy hour working weeks with no overtime, 
widespread sexual harassment of female employees, and high manual labour work for 
pregnant employees in an effort to have them resign.211 This was despite a detailed code 
of conduct imposed by WalMart of Honduran suppliers that forbade, inter alia, the use of 
child labour. The subsequent scandal resulted in a public pledge by Ms Gifford ‘to not 
tolerate sweatshop conditions’, the relocation by WalMart o f production and the setting
2,0 The discussion will not cover the two multilateral instruments regulating MNE conduct: the 
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises of 1976 and the 
ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
of 1977. For a detailed discussion and comparison of these instruments see Legal Problems of 
Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises (ed. N. Horn) (Deventer: Kluwer, 1980) pp. 127 
-176.
211 ‘Kathy Lee and the Sweatshop Crusade’, Los Angeles Times, 14 June 1996.
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up by Ms Gifford of her own ‘labour conditions inspection team '.212 However in 
September 1999 new allegations surfaced of abusive labour practices in El Salvadoran 
factories producing Ms Gifford’s line.213 The sight of two of the factory’s worker in 
Washington before the media has generated a large amount of publicity and prompted a 
new consumer boycott. WalMart is again considering the costly exercise of moving 
production.
Codes thus fulfil a warranty role: both from the supplier to the retailer and from the 
retailer to the consumer that goods are produced in acceptable conditions. A properly 
implemented code will cost money, both for the supplier in adhering to it and for the
i
retailer in establishing and maintaining verification regimes. While for the supplier this 
could mean jobs loses or even insolvency, for the retailer this cost merely increases the 
need to bring the existence of its codes to the attention of consumers in order to justify 
higher prices and ‘to stop less prominent and less scrupulous competitors benefiting from 
their new-found virtue’ .214 215
Codes of conduct are adopted voluntarily in the sense that there is no legal compulsion to 
adopt. This is the source of many weaknesses of codes in promoting labour standards. 
These will be discussed in detail below. A further consequence is that codes are not 
legally enforceable as labour standards. They can, however, expose enterprises and 
subcontractors to liability under trade practices, false advertising and antitrust legislation. 
If the terms of a code are incorporated into a supply contract, then there will be 
contractual remedies for their breach between the sub-contractor and the enterprise.
The coverage of codes of conduct containing labour provisions varies widely. The best-
213 ‘Kathie Lee Line Faulted on Labor’, Associated Press NewsWire 22 September 1999
214 The Economist, 5 December 1998. r
215 On codes of conduct generally see: Tsogas, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Labour 
especially pp. 64-70; J. Murray, ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct and Labour Standards’ in 
Mastering the Challenge of Globalisation: Towards a Trade Union Agenda (ed. R. Kyloh) 
(Geneva: ILO, 1998) pp. 45-104; Legal problems o f codes o f conduct for multinational
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known operational codes are those adopted either by a single enterprise or an 
enterprise association, the latter being the result of a consensus between members of the 
association. These are to be distinguished from codes adopted by employers' 
organisations. An approach that is increasingly adopted by enterprises or enterprise 
associations, is to draft a joint code with a workers' organisation, an approach which 
provides the enterprise with clear benefits in terms of credibility and industrial relations, 
though there is uncertainty as to the effect of such codes on collective bargaining
216
enterprises (ed, N. Horn) (Deventer: Kluwer, 1980); R. Waldmann Regulating international 
business through codes of conduct (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1980); U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, The 
apparel industry and codes of conduct ; a solution to the international child labor problem? 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1996); Joint report on the main issues emerging 
from the EU-US 1 Symposium on Codes o f Conduct and International Labour Standards, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept, of Labor, 1998); J. Diller, ‘A social conscience in the global 
marketplace? Labour dimensions of codes of conduct, social labelling and investor initiatives’ 
Vol. 138 No. 2 International labour review (1999), p. 99; M. Emmelhainz, R. Adams ‘The 
Apparel Industry Response to "Sweatshop’' Concerns: A Review and Analysis of Codes of 
Conduct’, Vol. 35 No. 3, The Journal o f Supply Chain Management (1999), p. 51; R, Liubicic, 
‘Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of 
Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initiatives’, Vol. 30, No. 1 Law and policy 
in international business, p. 111; R. Toftoy, ‘Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 
Global Theater. Is Nike Just Doing It?’ Vol. 15 No. 3 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law p. 905; N. Krug, ‘Exploiting Child Labor: Corporate Responsibility and the 
Role of Corporate Codes of Conduct’ Vol. 14 No. 3 New York Law School Journal of Human 
Rights. 1998 p. 651; W. van Genugten and S. van Bijsterveld, ‘Codes of Conduct for 
Multinational Enterprises: Useful Instruments or a Shield Against Binding Responsibility?’ Vol. 
7 No. 2 Tilburg Foreign Law Review. 1998, p. 161; K. Hagen, ‘Issues Involving Codes of 
Conduct from an ILO Perspective’ Vol. 92 (1998) Proceedings o f the American Society o f 
International Law p. 267; G. van Liemt, ‘Codes of conduct and international subcontracting: a 
‘private’ road towards ensuring minimum labour standards in export industries’ in Global 
Production and Local Jobs (eds G. Gereffi, F. Palpacuer and A Parisotto)(Geneva: IILS, 1999 
forthcoming); L. Roberts, ‘Codes of Conduct and Implications for Small Enterprises’, Vol. 9 
No.3 (1998) Small Enterprise Development, p. 2; Bums, M. et al., Open Trading: Options for 
effective monitoring of corporate codes o f conduct (London: New Economics Foundation and 
Catholic Institute for International Relations 1997); United States Council for International 
Business, Statement of the United States Council for International Business: codes of conduct: 
old solutions to old problems, 9 July 1997.
216 Operational codes are to be distinguished from model codes which are issued by enterprise 
associations, unions, NGOs and now governments to influence the way in which operational 
codes are drafted and implemented, for example by promoting consistency in language and levels 
of standards. An important recent development in model codes was a January 1999 resolution of 
the European Parliament recommending a model code for European businesses operating in 
developing countries that would be based on core ILO conventions (A-4-0508/98).
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procedures. This form of hybrid code is taken a step further with NGO involvement. 
This has not unsurprisingly seen a level of friction between the worker and NGO actors in 
the code-drafting process. A successful example is the UK Ethical Trading Initiative 
which balances the involvement of workers’ organisations and NGOs.* 218 There has also 
been an attempt to introduce a code with global coverage. In June 1998 the New York 
based Council on Economic Priorities launched its SA8000, a standard based on 
manufacturing quality standards, but covering a company’s performance in basic labour 
rights and monitored externally. The scheme has only met with moderate success.
The ways in which codes of conduct operate in practice vary widely, depending on the 
scope of the code, its supervision provisions, and above all, the commitment of the 
enterprise to the successful operation of its code. To illustrate the main common 
operational features of codes, we will briefly examine the code of conduct operated by 
Federated Department Stores Inc. (FDS), an American MNE which is the largest operator 
of department stores in the United States under the trading names Bloomingdale ’s, The 
Bon Marche, Burdines, Macy's, Rich's/Lazarus/Goldsmith’s, and S tem ’s. FDS adopted a 
Vendor/Supplier Code of Conduct in 1996 following the debate over Kathy Lee Gifford 
suppliers.219 The FDS Code was sent to each of the company’s existing suppliers with a 
covering letter in which the supplier was asked to sign a form acknowledging that the 
supplier has ‘received the Code, understands and agrees to adhere to its contents and is in 
compliance’ .220 Suppliers are then informed that ‘each vendor of ... merchandise must 
sign and return this letter as a condition of doing business with [FDS]’. New suppliers are 
sent the same material, thus ensuring that every FDS supplier is in theory bound by the 
Code.221
9 1 7
21 One approach is for the code to be incorporated into the national level collective agreement. 
An example is the EURATEX/ETUF-TCL agreements: GB.273/WP/SDL/l(Rev.l), para. 40.
218 Interview with Simon Steyne, International Officer, TUC, Geneva, 18 June 1999. See also 
http://www.ethicaltrade.0rg/about/content.shtml#wl10involved.
219 See generally http://www.federated-fds.com/report/chapter5/index 2 5.asp.
220 FDS form letter to vendors, on file with the author.
221 The Code itself goes on to specify that acceptance by suppliers or purchase order and shipping
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The FDS Code itself sets out six substantive labour standards that must be guaranteed: a 
prohibition on forced labour, prohibition on certain child labour, freedom from 
harassment and abuse, non-discrimination, a limitation on and payment for overtime 
worked and right to a rest day each week. Otherwise, suppliers are enjoined to respect the 
domestic labour laws. A verification procedure is established under which FDS is 
authorised to use employed and third party monitors to conduct ‘pre-production 
evaluations’ and subsequent ‘unannounced and unaccompanied inspections’. Technical 
standards are laid down for measuring compliance in the areas of age and wage 
verification,* 222 health and safety223 and dormitories. The verification procedure is carried 
out on a permanent basis and involves a significant level of company resources. In Italy 
alone, ten employees are engaged on a part-time basis to conduct unannounced supplier 
inspections.224 25The verification form used by these inspectors runs to 58 sections and over 
100 questions, all of which must be answered, including questions that require physical 
measurements, such as for light intensity and doorway dimensions. The Report must be 
signed by the inspector, the supplier, the quality control manager, the local FDS office 
manager and the by the regional executive vice present in either Hong Kong or New 
York. These reports are then filed as a defence against any claims in the future. Line 
managers in the company are required to report regularly on the number and result of 
unannounced site inspection of suppliers.
While it is not suggested that all codes of conduct operate in a manner similar to that of 
FDS, the above summary of the FDS code structure is intended to illustrate:
1. the seriousness with which codes of conduct are approached in large reputable 
MNE’s. It appears that a similar level of sophistication is maintained in the codes 
systems of other large apparel retailers in the United States; and 226
of goods each constitute a ‘continuing affirmation of compliance’ with the Code.
222 Such as production of clear wage slips and file documentation verifying a worker’s age.
223 Such as the number of toilet facilities, the level of lighting, the size of fire exits etc.
224 Interview with I. Christofferssen, Vice-President (Europe) FDS, 21 May 1999.
225 FDS Manufacturer Compliance Evaluation Report (or file with the author).
226 US Department of Labor, Codes o f Conduct in the U.S. Apparel Industry, Washington: Dept.
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2. the way in which the codes affect the relationship between retailer and supplier 
and retailer and foreign worker.
The FDS code will also provide an example against which the strengths and weaknesses 
of codes can be tested in the discussion below.
2. Problems with codes o f  conduct
Many commentators see the rise of codes of conduct as a positive development in the 
enforcement of labour standards. “ They are seen to be more effective in eliminating 
poor working conditions because they rely on commercial rather than legal pressure, and 
they overcome the very real problems of lack of enforcement of domestic labour law in 
many countries. Some say that because of the unlikelyhood of a link between trade and 
labour standards, codes of conduct and other ‘ethical sourcing' initiatives offer the only 
way forward.* 2728 On the other hand, they are also seen as embodying a high degree of 
flexibility which is lacking in international labour standards: flexibility in terms of being 
able to tailor labour standards to the commercial, geographical, political and social 
circumstances of the employing supplier. Flexibility also in terms of stipulating a small 
set of core standards which are non-negotiable, but not regulating every aspect of the 
employment relationship. Codes are also seen as prime means of engendering corporate 
social responsibility (forming, together with environmental and financial obligations, the 
much vaunted ‘triple bottom line’ )229 and as a means of somehow compensating for the
of Labor, 1996:
(http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/media/reports/apparel/main.htm).
227 See Tsogas, Corporate Codes o f Conduct and Labour; U.S. Department of Labor, The 
apparel industry and codes of conduct; van Liemt, ‘Codes of conduct and international 
subcontracting’; and Bums, M. et al,, Open Trading.
228 Tsogas, p. 60. Tsogas makes the case for codes generally (see pp. 1-15).
229 A recent development in corporation governance, the bottom line in measuring an enterprise’s 
measure is seen to have expanded from the solely financial to include environmental and social 
indicators. See J. Elkington Cannibals with Forks: the Triple Bottom Line o f 21st Century 
Business, (Oxford: Capstone, 1997) and C. Desgan, ‘Implementing Triple Bottom Line 
Performance and Reporting Mechanisms’, Voi. 70 No. 4 Charter (1999) p. 40. The triple bottom
6 6
il.-]
r  ■-
,->r.
V*
■ i ■
shrinking of the public sector which has followed trade liberalisation.* 230 231
n i l
However, these perceived benefits are increasingly challenged by a large number of 
disadvantages in the codes system which have detailed in recent literature. As voluntary 
private initiatives, codes are not subject to any state regulation, one of the consequences 
being that their content varies widely. Codes are thus selective in the areas they regulate, 
the standards they set, the industries they cover and even the workers covered within one 
industry. They overwhelmingly focus on export industries and within that field, on a 
small number o f sectors: textiles, clothing, leather and footwear, food and beverage, and 
the chemical and toy industries. ' These target industries are distinguished by their high 
consumer profile and susceptibility to consumer pressure. Workers in industries without 
these features are unlikely to benefit from a code of conduct. On the other hand, where a 
code is adopted it often discriminates against producers in developing countries who are 
less able to comply higher standards. This discrimination can be translated into job losses 
as subcontractors in the South attempt to comply with a code. Subcontractors producing 
items for more than on retailer may also find themselves subject to more than one code, 
and perhaps two sets of work conditions.233
This selectivity also applies to the substantive rights codes seek to guarantee. Although 
less so than in respect of social labelling, codes are often single or dual issue instruments, 
concentrating emotive issues likely to interest consumers, such as child labour and the 
physical safety of workers. The FDS Code covers a mere six substantive labour standards. 
Even if we focus on only the four fundamental rights covered in the ILO Declaration, the
line concept has received criticism for its potential to compromise three disparate forms of value 
on one balance sheet: N. Mayhew, ‘Trouble with the triple bottom line’, Financial Times, 10 
August 1998 referred to in GB.273AVP/SDL/l(Rev.l), footnote 2.
230 Hence, Robert Reich, the former U.S. Secretary of Labor, complained that the US Labor 
Department had only 800 wage and hour inspectors to cover 6 million work sites, and in the 
garment industry alone, there are 22,000 registered contractors. Private inspectors enforcing 
codes of conduct, he felt, could help in bridging the gap: Los Angeles Times June 14,1996.231
There is little reliable empirical evidence to be used in evaluating the effects of codes: 
GB.273/WP/SDL/l(Rev.l) para. 35.
232 GB.273/WP/SDL/l(Rev.l), para. 32.
233 Bums, Open Tradings p. 31.
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FDS code omits freedom of association and the right to collectively bargain. This appears 
indicative of codes at large. In a forthcoming survey of 215 codes of conduct to be 
published by the ILO,234 health and safety issues appeared in roughly 75 per cent of all 
codes, the most frequent occurrence. Freedom from discrimination appeared in two 
thirds, child labour in 45 per cent, and forced labour in 25 per cent. Freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining appeared in only 15 per cent of codes 
surveyed.
Further, the content of rights in codes appears to be largely self-defined, with the use of 
ILO conventions the exception rather than the rule:
Among the codes reviewed ... self-definition appeared to be the leading method 
of establishing labour practice goals, particularly among enterprise-drafted codes. 
[D]efinitions varied widely in similarity or divergence from international labour 
standards on the given issues. Self-defined standards appeared most frequently, ... 
to set goals implicating level o f wages, health and safety, and certain fundamental 
labour rights. Code provisions which only used portions of ILO instruments in 
many cases changed the meaning or intended protection of the instrument and 
qualified as self-definitions.235
Codes also suffer from their unilateral nature. There is generally no input from the 
workers they seek to protect in their drafting and no negotiation with the employers they 
seek to bind. Indeed despite being largely publicised to consumers by the enterprise 
concerned, many workers are entirely unaware of the existence of a code of conduct 
regulating their employer and their work.236 237The notion of for whose benefit codes of 
conduct are adopted can become unclear, even perverse:
It is time that consumers are protected from buying flowers from multinational1 - 237companies that deny basic rights to their workers.
On the other hand, where a workers organisation is involved different issues arise. The
234 M. Urminsky, Corporate social responsibility and initiatives relating to the conditions of 
work (Geneva: ILO, forthcoming 1999).
235 GB.273/WP/SDL/1 (Rev. 1), para. 50.
236 US Department of Labor, Codes of Conduct, p. 86.
237 British TUC General Secretary John Monks arguing for an industry code of conduct in respect
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uncertain effect on collective bargaining procedures of a union’s negotiating a code of 
conduct has already been mentioned. Further, because the code is in these instances being 
negotiated with a foreign enterprise, there is scope for a compromise on the level of 
labour standards applicable. Hence, a code may offer lower protection than even domestic 
labour laws. This is exacerbated by the unequal access to information among the 
bargaining parties.
Most documented failures of codes, however, concern their implementation. It is easy 
for enterprises to adopt a robust code, then ignore implementation. Even MNEs 
ostensibly serious about implementing their codes admit that takes ‘at least five to 10 
years to complete voluntary systems’ .* 238940 If an implementation scheme exists, it is in the 
first instance internal, as in the case of the FDS code. Often linked to an internal quality 
assurance programme or other corporate governance mechanism, internal implementation 
schemes suffer from inadequately trained staff and non-standardised verification criteria. 
We saw above that the FDS Code includes a highly detailed reporting questionnaire 
which attempts to standardise verification indicators. FDS inspectors are trained in 
verification techniques and standards with a training video which would seem to promote 
standardisation across all regions in which the company buys merchandise.241 While 
some enterprise associations have attempted to standardise verification criteria across 
different codes, the exercise is hampered by the varying rights and standards contained in 
codes themselves.242
Largely motivated by the high cost o f verification and the desire to appear non-self­
regulating, some larger MNE’s have adopted external implementation measures to
of flower workers: Financial Times, 9 May 1997.
238 See GB.273/WP/SDL/I(Rev.l), para. 59.
239 For a good description of implementation problems see: S. Zadek, P. Pruzan and R. Evans, 
Building corporate accountability: Emerging practices in social and ethical accounting, auditing 
and reporting (London: Earthscan, 1997).
240 ‘Retailers accused of delay’, Financial Times 16 March 1999.
241 Interview with I. Christofferssen, Vice-President (Europe) FDS, 21 May 1999.
242 The lack of standardisation also means lack of comparable data to measure progress in the 
field.
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supplement or replace internal systems. This has lead to the growth of the social auditing 
industry, some of which is industry-based (relying on enterprise associations) and some 
NGO-based. But more and more the external social auditor is a professional inspection or 
auditing firm, the latter offering social and environmental auditing as adjunct services to 
their existing financial audit clients. Similar problems of unqualified staff and non- 
standardised indicators exist with external mechanisms, though these seem to be 
diminishing in comparison to internal monitoring mechanism as industry-wide expertise 
is focused on a small number of external monitoring organisations. In the case of 
accounting firms, however, conflict of interest concerns arise where established financial 
audit clients are also social audit clients. One might say that any possible conflict is no 
greater that that of a firm that gives clients accounting and tax advice, and is also engaged 
to perform a financial audit. However, financial audits are a statutory requirement, and 
penalties for fraudulent auditing are severe. No such public duties or penalties arise in 
respect of social auditing, save perhaps in relation to trade practices legislation.
3. Codes of Conduct and the ILO
The foregoing discussion briefly outlined the nature of and problems associated with 
codes of conduct adopted by MNE’s as a means of regulating labour conditions in foreign 
countries. Our interest in codes arises from their relationship to the ILO’s system of 
international labour standards. Their significance derives not only from the exponential 243
243 Hence the accounting firm KPMG offers a ‘Sustainability Advisory Service’ which offers 
companies: *(a) reputational risk assessment will assist corporations with identification, 
assessment and management of critical social, environmental and ethical risks; (b) business 
process improvement will assist clients with improving in economic, social and environmental 
performance through the development of appropriate business information systems and more 
open relationships with stakeholders, (c) supply chain management will assist corporations to 
manage social and environmental exposure within their supply chains; and (d) social and 
environmental reporting will assist companies to progress to a position where they can produce 
auditable social and environmental reports that reflect corporate values.’
(see: http://www.kpmg.net/librarv/98/december/storv2b.asp).
The growth of this business appears to be exponential. According to 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, another large accounting firm, from a position in 1997 where ‘ethical 
audits’ were ‘rare’ , the firm conducted 1,500 in the twelve months to January 1999 in one 
Chinese province alone: ‘Sweatshop Wars’, The Economist, 27 February 1999.
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growth in the adoption of codes of conduct in the last 10 years,244 but also from their 
visibility generated by ‘sweatshop scandals* such as that as befell Ms Gifford. These 
exposés have resulted in consumer action (even boycotts) and eventual promises by 
enterprises to be vigilant against the use of abusive labour practices by their suppliers, 
expressed in the form of codes of conduct. Such an evolution in the cases high profile 
enterprises such as Nike,245 Reebok,246 Phillips-Van Heusen247 and Gap,248 has meant that 
private initiatives in the area of labour standards are now arguably better known to the 
layperson than is the ILO standards system. Private initiatives in general and codes of 
conduct in particular became a phenomenon that the ILO could not ignore:
[P]rivate initiatives aimed at promoting certain principles and social objectives 
have become a universal reality with a variety of forms, and constitute an 
important element in the international debate on the social dimensions of 
economic development. ... Even if, for the reasons set out in the previous 
sections, one may question the viability or sustainability of some of these 
initiatives, it is reasonable to think that this phenomenon will continue to develop 
whatever the ILO’s position on the matter. Under pressure from the public and 
from consumers, taken up and maintained by an increasing number of NGOs and 
by the development of a world network facilitating distribution of information, 
enterprises will undoubtedly react with increasing numbers and more rapidly by 
making commitments of various kinds and at various levels to offset risks or 
benefit from advantages that a good social or environmental image can have in 
commercial terms.249
But until recently the ILO had largely ignored the rise of what can be seen as a parallel,
244 There are few statistics on the rate of growth of codes, most of the literature merely referring 
to ‘rapid proliferation’ (Diller), ‘resurgence’ (Murray) or ‘a proliferation’ (US Dept of Labor). 
An indication of the recent growth of codes can be gleaned from assertions that the Levi Strauss 
Inc code adopted in 1991 was the first ethical sourcing code developed (US Department of 
Labor, Codes of Conduct, p. 8, and van Liemt, Codes o f Conduct and International 
Subcontracting, part 4.1). By 1996 36 of the 42 largest retail MNEs in the United States (based 
on gross sales) had either a codes of conduct or some other written document obliging foreign 
suppliers to guarantee at least the use of non-child labour (Ibid,, p. iv). Other surveys in the area 
appear less reliable both in terms of the type of enterprises surveyed and the response rate. See 
for example The Conference Board, Corporate Ethics Practices, 1992 and KPMG, 1997 
Business Ethics Survey Report, (http://www.kpmg.ca/ethics/home.htm)
245 http://www.nikebiz.com/labor/labor.shtml
246 http://www.reebok.com/annual report/hmn intro.html
247 http://www.pvh.eom/corp/s workersrights.html.
248 http://www.gapinc.com/communitv/sourcing/vendor conduct.htm
249 GB.273/WP/SDL/l (Rev. 1) paras 110-111.
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private system of international labour standards. As an organisation, the issue was first
addressed by the Director General in his Report to the 1994 ILC, albeit in couched terms:
*
... the ILO must tackle the issue [of non-governmental actors in standard setting] 
by supplementing its normative and para-normative work with the other means at 
its disposal -  means which could enable it to mobilize and directly involve the 
non-governmental actors.250
We have already discussed the rejection at the same ILC by the tripartite constituents of 
the Director General’s proposal for a global social label. Similar opposition has kept the 
issue of codes of conduct away from the agenda of the Governing Body. It was also 
assumed that as the ILO had no mandate to address enterprises,251 little could be done.252 
The Organisation thus had no policy on private initiatives. Naturally, an increasing 
number of enterprises, NGOs, and governments were requesting ILO advice on the use of 
codes. Without a policy orientation, the Office was merely able to provide information on 
ILO standards and their possible relevance the request whilst making it clear the ILO did 
not endorse any private initiatives.253 This policy gap largely restricted Office activities 
in the area of private initiatives to research.254
A comprehensive study of ‘global developments and Office activities concerning codes of 
conduct, social labelling and other private sector initiatives addressing labour issues’ was
rso Defending Values, p. 66.
•yc i
In the absence of an instrument such as the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 1977.
252 See Report of WP/SDL to the 274* Session of the Governing Body (oral report by the 
Chairperson available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/20gb/docs/gb274/gb-15.htm).
25? GB.273/WP/SDL/l(Rev.l), para. 133.
254 See GB.273/WP/SDL/l(Rev.l), paras 94-109. The principal Office activities in the area of 
private initiatives were: ENTREPRISE published a discussion paper on Social initiatives by 
enterprises, ACT/EMP convened a ‘Meeting on Corporate Citizenship and Social Initiatives’ in 
October 1998; ACTRAV included implementation of codes of conduct in its programme to 
promote more effective responses by workers' organizations at local, national and international 
levels; TRAVAIL published a preliminary study entitled Labelling Child Labour Products in 
June 1997; and SECTOR convened a number of tripartite meeting on voluntary initiatives in the 
chemical industry (see Report for the Tripartite Meeting on Voluntary Initiatives Affecting 
Training and Education on Safety, Health and Environment in the Chemical Industries). The 
most substantive work has been undertaken in the context of the International Programme on the 
Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC). An IPEC project in the Bangladesh has developed and 
implemented a third-party monitoring and verification system against child labour in the garment
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commissioned by WP/SDL in late 1997* 255 and a follow-up in late 1998.256 The Report 
put forward three options for ILO activity in the area. The first, the ‘minimalist position’, 
described the status quo. A more ambitious option saw the Organisation offering advice 
(perhaps through the publishing of manuals and guides) to enterprises in drafting codes so 
as to ensure ‘their compatibility with the ILO’s objectives and their viability’. Advice and 
training could also be offered to enterprises faced with operating in an ethical sourcing 
environment, including training of inspectors. 257 258The third option, ‘a proactive position 
of engagement’, envisaged the drafting of a code of good practice in drafting and 
implementing codes of conduct, that was addressed to enterprises using either an 
amendment to the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 1977 or a new tripartite instruments 
There was, however, clearly no consensus among the tripartite groups that would allow 
this third option to be chosen.
With this detailed Office report and a follow-up before it, the WP/SDL (as a working 
party of the Governing Body) was asked ‘to express its views on appropriate ILO action 
in this field in order to guide the Director-General in the preparation of future 
proposals’ .259 Its response however, was to take maintain the current minimalist position 
and ask the Office to undertake more research.260 The ILO is thus yet to engage private 
initiatives.
industry. A similar involvement was being planned in the Pakistan soccer ball industry.
255 GB .273/WP/SDL/1 (Rev. 1 ).
256 GB.274/WP/SDL/1 (Further examination of questions concerning private initiatives, 
including codes of conduct).
257 GB.273/WP/SDL/I(Rev.l) para. 136. This option seemed to be endorsed by the Director 
General Somavia in his first Report to the ILC: see Decent Work, p. 43.
258 Ibid. para. 138.
259 GB.274/WP/SDL/1 para. 29. This sense that the Organisation is waiting for urgent policy 
guidance in the area of private initiatives is reinforced by the Director General’s Programme and 
Budget Proposals for 2000-1 of March 1999 in which he wrote:
At the time of drafting these budget proposals, some key elements of the 2000-01 
programme of work of the ILO are still awaiting further discussion in the decision­
making organs. Among them [is] ... work supporting private sector initiatives such as 
corporate codes of conduct. (GB.274/PFA/9/1 para.5).
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4. Codes of conduct and the ILO system of international labour standards: 
challenging or complementary?
Can the ILO safely ignore private initiatives in general and codes of conduct in 
particular? Are they a short-lived ineffectual fad or do they threaten the ILO’s normative 
role? In the first instance, it appears that codes of conduct, along with other private sector 
initiatives, will be a feature on the international labour regulation landscape for some time 
to come. Rather than being seen as a fad, codes are considered even by MNEs as an 
entrenched ‘part of business life’. We now even see ‘second generation’ codes of 
conduct such as that adopted recently by the US-based MNE Nike Inc. The hitherto 
narrow scope o f codes is gradually expanding as MNEs combine their various codes on 
environment, labour and business ethics into single instruments.
Can the rise of codes and other private initiatives be seen as a reaction to an ineffective 
ILO labour standards system? It is difficult to see a direct link between the perceived 
weaknesses in the ILO system and private initiatives. Codes arose with a commercial 
imperative. Their prime targets are consumers rather than foreign workers. A more 
effective ILO system would not necessarily have meant that codes would not arise. The 
late 1960s and early 1970s was a period in during which the ILO standards system.was 
perceived as being effective and efficient,260 163 yet also a period of high growth in the use of 
codes of conduct.264
However the global trade liberalisation that has been outlined earlier in this thesis as a 
prime contemporary challenge to the ILO’s standards system is also responsible for
260 Report of WP/SDL to the 274th Session of the Governing Body.
261 ‘Amnesty Questions Ethics of Multinationals’, Financial Times 22 April 1998.
262 Nike’s New Code of Conduct (http://www.nikebiz.com/labor/labor.shtml).
263 See Landy, Chapter 3.
264 The period included promotion of codes by governments (Canadian Government’s Some 
Guiding Principles of Good Corporate Behaviour for Subsidiaries in Canada of Foreign 
Companies (1967), the Code of Behaviour for Japanese Investors Overseas (1973), and the US 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977)) and concluded with the OECD and ILO Declarations, (see 
Murray, pp. 51-52).
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conditions which, as we have seen above, are conducive to the emergence of codes of 
conduct. Foreign-located production, increased capital mobility and pressure by MNEs on 
developing countries to maintain cheap labour costs combine with increased technology 
and information flows to give consumers not only cheap foreign produced brand-name 
merchandise, but (increasingly) also knowledge of the conditions under which their 
purchases are manufactured. Hence we see trade liberalisation producing the somewhat 
perverse result o f both increased consumer knowledge of working conditions but a 
decreased effectiveness of both governments and the ILO to regulate these conditions. 
Consumer pressure for change then focuses not on governments but those actors who are 
perceived to have the power to make change across borders, MNEs. The ILO system is 
thus largely bypassed.
If the rise of codes and the problems of the ILO system of international labour standards 
are then seen as two facets of one phenomenon (rather than there being a causal link 
between the two), can the two systems co-exist ? Codes may support the ILO system, 
damage it or not effect it at all. Insofar as codes encourage or even cajole employers to 
respect certain ILO standards (such as the principle of non-discrimination), they can be 
seen as supporting the ILO system of labour standards. This simple observation however 
belies the complexity of the relationship between codes and ILO standards. It must first 
be accepted that the scope of codes is extremely limited in many respects. They only 
cover a select group of workers (those of a supplier), in a few select high profile 
industries. They apply overwhelmingly to suppliers in developing countries, the 
assumption seeming to be that developed country workers can rely on domestic labour 
standards. Their scope is also limited in terms of rights. As we have seen, codes seek to 
regulate a handful of rights, and only in a very few cases are all fundamental labour rights 
as defined in the ILO Declaration included. Some of the rights themselves are even 
limited in scope, with a variety of definitional sources being used.265 In this respect codes 
and private initiatives generally will not be able to compete against the breadth and depth
26S ILO Conventions are but one source. Definitions of standards are drawn also from national 
and, worse, are self-defined: GB.273/WP/SDL/l(Rev.l), paras 50-52.
75
LLL
V j ï î ;
of the international labour code. How, for instance, would a private initiative deal with 
ILO Convention No. 122 on domestic employment policy?
But in the limited areas of their scope, there is a real possibility that codes could damage 
the ILO system. As the Office report of private initiatives noted, ‘such initiatives and the 
attainment of the ILO's objectives will not automatically converge’ .266 Let us consider the 
position of a worker in a factory in a developing country. If that country has not ratified 
core ILO conventions, the worker’s situation is undeniably ameliorated by a code of 
conduct governing her work. If, however, the country has ratified all core conventions, 
then it is in her employer’s interest to adhere to the terms of the code rather than the core 
conventions (as embodied in domestic law) -  terms that will almost certainly be less 
generous to the worker than those of the convention. The reason for this is that by 
complying with the convention, the employer incurs the obligation to respect a relatively 
high level of labour conditions, but neither gains nor loses relative to other employers in 
the same jurisdiction, all of whom are covered by the conventions, but misses out on 
benefits flowing from a code such as the position of a preferred supplier on international 
markets.267
Our imaginary worker’s comrade in a non-export industry is likely not to have the option 
of being the subject of a code of conduct. Her employer has no choice but to abide by the 
national labour law which is based on the more generous ILO convention. (This is not to 
suggest that, legally, the exporter is not under the same obligation. However in choosing 
which standards to apply on a day-to-day basis, or at least which abusive work practices 
to eliminate first, it is submitted that the exporter will follow the code before the law). 
This two-track approach between export and non-export employers, with a lower level of 
protection for the former, bears a close similarity to the situation of export processing 
zones (EPZs). EPZs have posed one of the largest challenges to the ILO system of labour
266 GB.273/WP/SDL/l(Rev.l), para. 130.
267 See Responding to global standards: A framework for assessing social and environmental 
performance o f industries: Case study o f the textile industry in India, Indonesia, and Zimbabwe 
(UNIDO, t998), referred to in GB.273AVP/SDL/l(Rev.l), footnote 152.
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standards over the past 30 years, spurring a large critical literature.268 Further, the above 
scenario would dissuade the government in question from ratifying more ILO 
conventions, as with employers choosing a standard that involves not monitoring or other 
resource allocation by the government, the benefits for a government of relying on codes 
of conduct are clear.
Codes thus present the latest competition for the ILO in the standards area. But this 
competition is different in nature from competitors in the past. Whereas previous 
competitors have been public sector actors with standards at least as high as fundamental 
ILO conventions (such as the European Union, the UN Committee on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights and even the World Bank), codes come from the private sphere and 
provide standards which are generally less advantageous for workers than those of the 
ILO. The challenge arises at a time when not only MNEs but many of the ILO’s own 
constituents are calling for greater flexibility in labour standards: flexibility that codes 
may appear to promote if not provide. As mentioned during our discussion of the 
Declaration, proponents of flexibility advocate the maintenance of only a small set of 
core labour standards, other rights in the workplace then flowing from those core rights. 
The advent of codes of conduct can only support this vision, as they rarely go beyond 
basic concepts such as non-discrimination and child labour. Of greater concern is near 
total exclusion of the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining from 
codes, the key right from which other employment rights will ‘flow’ under the flexibility 
model outlined above.
Codes also lack the purpose and sophistication of ILO standards that may not be 
appreciated at first glance. Let us take child labour as an example. This is a principle that
268 £p2 s are incjustriai zones with special incentives to attract foreign investors in which 
imported materials undergo some degree of processing before being exported again. These 
‘special incentives’ generally involve the restriction of worker rights, be it in terms of limited 
rights to organise, lower wages than their colleague outside the zone, and lower job security. For 
an overview of the concerns raised by EPZs see: ILO, Economic and social effects of 
multinational enterprises in export processing zones (Geneva: ILO, 1988); Export processing 
zones in Asia: some dimensions (ed. N. Vittal) (Tokyo: Asian Productivity Organization, 1977);
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appears frequently in codes of conduct. ILO action in the area of child labour derives 
from a view on part of the Organisation’s constituents that the practice is morally 
repugnant. While there are concerns about what might be the economic effect on child 
workers of a proscription on child labour, the motivation behind any proscription is 
ultimately the child’s welfare. Codes of conduct, on the other hand, require suppliers to 
avoid employing children because there are consumers or shareholders who find the 
practice morally repugnant. The proscription survives as long as there is either an 
identifiable consumer or at least consumer or shareholder pressure to maintain it. It may 
be said that this unnuanced argument takes no account o f the chief executives and 
business owners who may themselves be horrified by child labour. But if we focus on the 
motivation of the enterprise in adopting a code of conduct, it is submitted that as soon as 
there is no consumer pressure there is little commercial reason to adopt or maintain a 
code.
The ILO’s normative work in the area of child labour is similarly more sophisticated. 
One may say that a provision in a code of conduct such as:
The company will not tolerate the use of child labour.
is as good as or even better than the provisions of ILO conventions 138 an 182 dealing 
with child labour. Yet the code of conduct provision looks a fairly blunt instrument when 
one compares it to the essentially programmatic nature of the ILO approach to child 
labour. The code provision cannot compare against the ILO provisions which are part of a 
broader programmatic approach, involving technical assistance, training, education and 
rehabilitation.* 26970 This depth of approach is lost if suppliers choose to respect codes of 
conduct rather than ILO norms.
A further undermining affect of codes on the ELO system relates to tripartism. Rhetoric 
aside, tripartism is a strength of the ILO system. The voice of employers and workers in
World Bank, Export processing zones (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1992).
269 See t.a.n. 234.
270 GB,273/WP/SDL/1 (Rev. 1), para. 128.
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the standard setting process ensures that the standards set are achievable without being 
undemanding, and that the process prioritises areas of need rather than solely the political 
objectives of governments. It has already been mentioned that almost without exception, 
codes do not even include the input of the workers they claim to ‘protect’. They similarly 
have little public sector input. While this by itself constitutes a serious weakness in the 
authority and effectiveness of codes of conduct, when we consider the attractiveness of 
codes regimes over ILO conventions set out above, it becomes a challenge to tripartism, a 
central feature of the ILO system. Just as it is attractive to exporters and governments (for 
cost of other reasons) to opt for regulation by a code of conduct as outlined above, so too 
might the employers in the ILO process become less enthusiastic about supporting the 
adoption of new conventions and maintaining the integrity of those already adopted, 
knowing that a more flexible system (with clear commercial benefits such as brand-name 
enhancement as a bonus) exists. The Employers Group, which has been for some time 
demanding increased flexibility in industrial relations and a reigning in of the standards 
system, might see in codes an answer to its demands. It is interesting to note that the 
Employers Group has strongly rejected any substantive ILO engagement of private 
initiatives. It might be said that any such course of action taken by the Employers Group 
would merely be part of the dynamics o f rather than an attack on tripartism. However, the 
co-operation between the constituents on which tripartism is based, is underpinned by. the 
support of all constituents of the ILO project.271 If one constituent starts to look elsewhere 
and to other means to achieve the goals of the Organisation (to the exclusion of the ILO), 
then tripartism is threatened.
These challenges of codes of conduct private initiatives to the ILO standard setting 
system will only grow as long as the Organisation fails to engage with the phenomenon in 
substantive way. Clear policy options have been placed before the Governing Body in this
271 This can be construed from the Declaration of Philadelphia:
[T]he war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigor within each 
nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort in which the representatives 
of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of governments, join with 
them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view to the promotion of the 
common welfare. (Article I.d.)
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regard. These option take into account the limits of tripartite consensus and of the 
Organisation’s mandate. Yet a lack o f consensus within the Governing Body, largely 
driven by a lack o f political will on the part of government members, has left the 
Organisation looking increasingly sidelined.
8 0

V. CONCLUSIONS
The ILO is an international organisation approaching a crossroads. Its principle activity, 
standard setting, has , as we have seen, gradually been perceived as being more and more 
irrelevant over the past 30 years under the pressure of changing social and political 
conditions. Trade liberalisation has undermined not only the capacity of the ILO’s system 
to affect people’s working lives, but also the premise that the Organisation’s prime role is 
to set and supervise international labour standards. Faced with looming irrelevance, the 
ILO must either reinvent its standards system to make it relevant, efficacious and 
politically acceptable in the contemporary world, or look for other ways and means to 
ensure that all people are able to ‘pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual 
development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal
272opportunity’.
In looking at these other ways and means, the ILO is currently presented with two diverse 
options; options that we have considered in this thesis. The first, the Declaration, 
appears to represent a new direction from within the Organisation. This new direction, 
which does not happily coexist with the standards system, promotes a high degree of 
flexibility in the ILO’s future normative work. It focuses on a small set of core or 
fundamental standards which are said to be immutable, and endeavours to secure their 
respect by promotion and technical assistance rather than enforcement. The enthusiasm 
with which the Declaration was adopted and the near-universal calls for reform of the 
standards system at the 1999 ILC (among other things), suggest that the Declaration will 
grow in stature at the expense of the standards system. Similarly, the second option, 
codes of conduct, reduces labour rights to a core set from which all rights of the 
employment relationship are to flow. The private nature and commercial motives of codes 
of conduct pose even more problems for the standards system than the Declaration, but 
they are a reality that the Organisation cannot ignore. If embraced by the ILO, codes of 
conduct would form a parallel standards system to the traditional ILO system. For the 27
272 Article 11(a), Declaration of Philadelphia.
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reasons set out in Part IV however» it appears that codes would attract a greater following 
among employers and governments than the traditional standards system.
That the ILO’s system of international labour standards is thus seriously threatened by 
these two new initiatives. While it is not being suggested that the standards system will 
inexorably be subsumed, it does raise some crucial considerations for the Organisation. 
First, the option of revising the standards system is still open. Although calls for reform 
have been widespread, there has been little movement on the issue in the Governing Body 
or the Office. Any new revision initiatives now have the benefit of being able to take 
account of the Declaration and tailor the reform to bring the Declaration within the 
standards system to the extent possible.273 Second, whether or not a revision is achieved, 
it would be a great loss to the Organisation were the significant benefits of the standards 
system (outlined in Part II) lost. The development of both the Declaration and the ILO 
approach to codes of conduct could be infused with some of the virtues of the standards 
system. Ideas in this regards for the Declaration appear in Part IH.4. In respect of codes 
of conduct, detailed proposals are already before the Governing Body.274 275Finally, before 
embarking on these two initiatives that have the potential to radically alter the ILO’s 
standard setting role more than at any other time in its 80 year history, the Organisation 
and its constituents would do well to carefully consider its mandate, both in terms of its 
goals and in terms of the limits of its purview. The ILO system of labour standards is 
rooted in the Organisation’s goal of securing ‘humane conditions of labour’ across the 
globe. The system has survived longer than any other international supervisory system 
and has survived changing financial and social orthodoxies. As both the Declaration and 
private sector initiatives are driven by contemporary views and pressures, the ILO should 
be vigilant against embracing policy directions based purely on today’s pressures and 
interest groups that may ultimately be short-lived.
273 Options for this course of action appear in Part III.4 above.
274 GB.273AVP/SDL/1 (Rev. 1), paras 114-139.
275 Preamble, ILO Constitution.
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